

[Article]

## **New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe**

**Mizuho Nakada-Amiya, Takashi Narihiro**

### **Abstract**

Previous studies on new political parties have assumed that they change or disrupt the functioning of the party system and coalition politics by creating high electoral volatility. Five successful new parties in three elections analyzed in this article failed to validate these assumptions. The article presents preliminary analysis of the 22 new political parties with a view to finding the characteristic new party type in East-Central Europe, which is typically established for electoral success and often joins the governing coalition just after the election. Canonical discriminant analysis (Knutson 1989) showed that the five new parties that fell into this category changed neither party competition structures, nor coalition politics. Contrary to the general assumption, new parties of this type do not cause instability in the party system or affect coalition politics directly. However, as indirect outcomes, these parties may cause unclear ex-post accountability, voter disappointment and instability of coalition government.

*Keywords: new parties, canonical discriminant analysis, party system and coalition politics*

Repeated emergence of new parties has been one of the areas of focus in the study of East-Central European party politics. It was explained as the evidence of party system immaturity and had been expected to decrease in time (Tavits, 2008a). However, in the latest elections in six East-European countries from 2010 to 2012, 10 new parties won parliamentary seats. New parties have never faded out, even after more than twenty years of democratic experience, and they seem to have become an established phenomenon in these countries.

The previous studies have assumed that the presence of the new parties is problematic for the stability of party systems. Behind this assumption lay the new parties' image in Western Europe. Comparative politics research into new parties has been promoted since the 1970s, when new parties appeared, breaking the "frozen" political party system in Western Europe (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). New parties had been studied with a focus on the social cleavage model. It is commonly perceived that new parties represent new issues or ideologies that might create new

social cleavage (Hug 2001; Hino 2012). It was assumed that dimensions would be added to the party competition structure (Kitschelt 1988), and coalition politics would be changed inevitably because of the new elements.

These are the assumptions that would naturally underlie the existing studies on new parties in Western Europe. However, there are several studies that suggest a different image of new parties in East-Central Europe. Tavits (2008b) and Rose (2009) showed that the choices of elites are essential for the emergence of new parties, suggesting the possible emergence of new parties that are not based on a new issue or ideology among the electorate. Tavits (2008c) considered the new parties that were programmatically close to established parties. Sikk (2011) explicitly analyzed the existence of new parties for which newness itself was the appealing feature, with ideological character being only a weak motivation.

If the types of new parties in East-Central Europe are different from those in Western Europe, it is fair to assume that the resulting effect of new parties on party politics and coalition politics will also be different. Previous studies have criticized the emergence of new parties without investigating this possibility.

To analyze the new parties' effect on the party system and coalition politics, we chose canonical discriminant analysis (CDA) as the method which clearly shows party competition structure for each election (Knutsen 1989). Sets of variables that differentiate affiliation for the parties among members of the electorate could be found. Each set of variables indicated party competition structure. As a result, it became evident that emergence of new parties have hardly changed the party competition structure. Neither have coalition patterns been ever affected substantially. The effects of new parties on the party system and coalition politics could be characteristic in East-Central Europe.

This article presents preliminary analysis of the characteristic types of new parties in East-Central Europe. Twenty-two new parties were classified according to: (a) the number of years that elapsed between establishment and electoral success, (b) their participation in governing coalition, and (c) their electoral endurance. Five new parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia showed differences in these aspects, having been established just before their electoral success and often join the governing coalition after the election. In the second section, CDA was carried out on these five parties and the relating party systems, producing the above mentioned results. The last section examines the side effect on coalition politics, including ex-post accountability of governmental coalition, voters' disappointment, and coalition popularity.

## 1. Characteristic type of new parties in East-Central Europe

In the preliminary stage of the analysis to find the characteristic types of new parties in East-Central Europe, we investigated new parties that won seats since 2000 in six East-Central European Countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia. These countries have adopted the parliamentary system with elections based on proportional representation. Hungary, which used the single-seat constituency system combined with the proportional representative constituency approach, was the only exception. As for Hungary, we used proportional representative constituency data for our analysis. Previous studies on East-Central European party systems usually started analysis at the beginning of the democratization process to examine the institutionalization of party systems. In this study, we started the analysis as of the year 2000 so that we could explore the trend in recent years. In addition, the Slovak Democratic movement (HZDS) and Croatian Democratic Union (HZD) constrained pluralism in the 1990s in each country. By concentrating on the 2000s, it is also possible to remove this element.

The definition of *new parties* presents difficult problems (Sikk, 2005). In this article, new parties are defined as parties that won seats in parliament for the first time. A political party that just changes its name is not considered to be a new party. But if a new party was launched by some of the former members of a political party, we recognized it as an "offshoot new party" on condition that the original party continued to participate in the election. The original party could be called a "parent party."

By using the Election Database in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries<sup>1</sup>, which is published on the website of the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University, we listed 22 new parties and checked their size, time of establishment, policy orientation, prehistory (offshoot new party or not), names, coalition politics, and record of persistence (success or failure in the next election) (see Table 1).

New parties often started as medium-sized parties. The percentage of votes received tends to be relatively large, when they win the parliamentary seats for the first time. One reason is that in most East-Central European elections, the thresholds of 4-5% are provided. But the new parties often exceeded the threshold easily and won about 10% of votes. As is shown in Table 1, eight parties out of 22 parties won over 10% of votes.

In addition, 19 parties acquired parliamentary seats during the first election after their establishment. Most of them were established in the previous year or in the election year. There are three "exceptions." The Polish "Self-Defense," the Czech Green Party, and the Hungarian Jobbik were the only parties that had been established but not successful at the point of previous

New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe

Table1: New parties since 2000

First election which won seats	New Parties		Votes	Votes %	Seats	Seats %	Year of Foundation	result of the next election	policy orientation	Offshoot new party
Poland										
2001	Civic Platform	PORP	1,651,099	12.68%	65	14.10%	2001	Win seats	center-right	○
2001	Self-Defence	Samoobrona	1,327,624	10.20%	53	11.50%	1992	Win seats (Fail in 2007)	populist, left wing nationalism	
2001	Law and Justice	PiS	1,236,787	9.50%	44	9.60%	2001	Win seats	conservative	○
2001	League of Polish Families	LPR	1,025,148	7.87%	38	8.30%	2001	Win seats (Fail in 2007)	conservative	
2011	Palikot's Movement	Ruch Palikota	1,439,490	10.02%	40	8.70%	2011		green, center-left, personal initiative	○
Czech Republic										
2006	Green Party	SZ	336,487	6.29%	6	3.00%	1990	Fail	green, center-right	
2010	TOP 09	TOP 09	873,833	16.70%	41	20.50%	2009		center-right	○
2010	Public Affairs	VV (Věci veřejné)	569,127	10.88%	24	12.00%	2009		center-right	
Slovakia										
2002	Direction	SMER	387,100	13.46%	25	16.70%	1999	Win seats	center-left	○
2002	Alliance of New Citizens	ANO	230,309	8.01%	15	10.00%	2001	Fail	center-right	
2010	Freedom and Solidarity	SaS	307,287	12.15%	22	14.70%	2009	Win seats	center-right	
2010	Bridge	MOST-HÍD	205,538	8.13%	14	9.30%	2009	Win seats	center-right, ethnic party	○
2012	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	OĽaNO	218,537	8.55%	16	10.70%	2011		center-right	○
Hungary**										
2010	Jobbik	Jobbik	855,436	16.67%	26	17.80%	2003		radical right	
2010	Politics Can Be Different	LMP	383,876	7.48%	5	3.42%	2008		green	
Slovenia										
2000	New Slovenia - Christian People's Party	NSi	94,661	8.76%	8	8.90%	2000	Win seats	center-right	○
2000	Slovenian Youth Party	SMS	46,719	4.33%	4	4.40%	2000	Fail	green, center-right	
2008	Zares - New Politics	Zares	98,526	9.37%	9	10.00%	2007	Fail	center-right	○
2011	Zoran Janković's List - Positive Slovenia	LZJ-PS	314,273	28.51%	28	31.11%	2011		center-left, personal initiative	
2011	Virant's List	DL Gregorja Viranta	92,282	8.37%	8	8.89%	2011		center-right, personal initiative	
Croatia										
2011	Croatian Labourists - Labour Party	Hrvatski laburisti - Stranka rada	97,701	4.19%	6	4.29%	2010		center-left	○
2011	Grubišić's List	Ivan Grubišić	29,088	1.25%	2	1.43%	2011***		center-left, personal initiative	

\* Parties indicated by gray cells joined the ruling coalition after elections.

\*\* As for Hungary, votes, votes rate, seats and seats rate are that of proportional district (district list)

\*\*\* Grubišić himself participated in the 2003 election.

elections. They started as social movements outside parliament and won parliamentary seats after several years of activity. These parties have this feature in common with the "new parties" in Western Europe. Most of the new parties in East-Central Europe were established with an immediate focus on achieving electoral success. We may refer to these parties as election-oriented parties

As for policy orientation, ten new parties involved in the research were center-right, four center-left, two conservative, two "green," one radical right and one populist left-wing nationalist. Center-right new parties, which are about half of the 22 new parties, were found in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All of them were election-oriented parties that received a relatively high percentage of votes. New parties are easy to emerge with center-right orientations because, in contrast to the center-left position, where relatively coercive Social Democrats located themselves, most center-right parties in East-Central Europe are parliamentary parties with low levels of party discipline.

The influence of weak party discipline is also frequently found in offshoot new parties. Ten parties were offshoot new party; of these, six were center-right, two were center-left, one conservative and one "green." Politicians working for established parent parties left those parties and in cooperation with personalities outside political circles, they established new offshoot parties.

It is difficult to guess ideology or principles from the names of new parties. New parties named themselves so as to emphasize their newness (Sikk, 2011)<sup>2</sup>. They wanted to make the point that they were different from older parties. They tried to show that they were on the side of ordinary citizens, representing the public voice, as indicated in the names "Civic Platform," "Public Affairs," and "Ordinary People."

As for coalition politics, nine new parties joined governing coalitions just after the elections. There is an interesting difference evident among six countries. In the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, nine out of thirteen new parties became governing coalition partners. In Poland, Hungary, and Croatia, all the new parties remained in opposition.

As the last feature, we checked the endurance of new parties. New parties frequently emerge in East-Central Europe and fade out with the same frequency. Out of twelve parties that have experienced the next elections, six parties had already lost parliamentary seats, four of them losing at the very next election. Offshoot parties survived well in party systems. All six offshoot parties that challenged in the second election won seats. On the contrary, among the Public Affairs, Alliance of New Citizens and Freedom and Solidarity, which were established by the people outside parliaments, the first two parties could not be accommodated in the party system. "Green" parties or radical right parties are typical new parties in Western Europe that settled in

Table2: New parties electoral success and coalition participation in East-Central Europe since 2000

		Result of the next election	
		Success	Failure
Electoral success needs several years	Opposition(9)	Self-Defence(POL), (Jobbik(HUN)), (Politics Can Be Different(HUN))	
	Governmental coalition(1)		<u>The Green Party(CZ)</u>
Electoral success just after establishment	Opposition(9)	<i>Civic Platform(POL)</i> , <i>Jaw and Justice(POL)</i> , League of Polish Farmers(POL), ( <i>Palikot Movement(POL)</i> ), <i>Direction(SLK)</i> , ( <i>Ordinary People(SLK)</i> ), (Positive Slovenia(SLV)), ( <i>Croatian Labours(HRV)</i> ), (Grubis's list(HRV))	
	Governmental coalition(10)	( <i>TOP 09(CZ)</i> ), Freedom and <u>Solidarity(SLK)</u> , <u>Bridge(SLK)</u> , <i>New Slovenia Cristian Party(SLV)</i> , (Virant's List(SLV))	( <u>Public Affairs(CZ)</u> ), Alliance of New Citizens(SLK), Slovenian Youth Party(SLV), Zares(SLV)

\* Parties written in italics are offshoot new parties.

\* Parties in parenthesis won parliamentary seats at the latest election in each country.

\* Underlined parties are investigated in the second section.

the party system. In East-Central Europe, "green" parties found difficulty fitting in. No "green" party has ever succeeded in being elected twice to the parliament.

From the perspective of this article, new parties that joined the governing coalition after the election attracted our attention. These parties are concentrated in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia; most of them are election-oriented new parties (see Table 2). When new parties join the coalition government, do they affect party competition structure or coalition politics? To investigate this question, we chose five new parties of this category and four relevant elections in the Czech Republic and Slovakia to carry out further analysis, which is discussed in the next section. The reasons for differences in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, on the one hand, and Poland, Hungary and Croatia, on the other, also captured our attention, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this article.

## 2. New Parties in the party systems

We chose the Green Party, TOP 09, the Public Affairs Party, the Freedom and Solidarity Party, and the Bridge for further investigation, and we analyzed the relevant elections held in the years 2002, 2006, 2010 for the Czech Republic and the Slovak election held in 2010.

First, we analyzed the party position on the left-right axis by following three aspects: (a) party position on the left-right axis according to all respondents, (b) positioning on the

left-right axis of the political party according to voters who voted for the party, and (c) self-placement on the left-right axis by the voters who voted for each political party.

Next, we conducted CDA to interpret the characteristics of the party competition structures<sup>3</sup>. CDA is a statistical technique that is used to estimate canonical discriminant functions (CDFs), which describe separation among groups based on specified linear composites (discriminant variables) of the outcome variables. In this article, we use as outcome variables party preferences or party choices in elections, and as candidates for discriminant variables, we use political issues, political ideologies, and demographic attributes. The CDFs and the discriminant variables define the issue dimensions of the party systems, each data case is a point on a scale of these dimensions and has composite canonical scores on the scales, defined as CDFs. A particular group (possibly supporters of a party) is represented by a swarm of points concentrated in some position on a particular scale. To summarize the position of a group, we can compute the group mean (the 'centroid'). We may plot centroids on the scales and interpret the character of the party systems based on the order of the centroids and the distance between them. After estimating CDFs, we can calculate discriminant rates (presented in classification tables) showing how much CDFs discriminate between the data properly. We identify them as an indicator of differentiation between the groups that support the parties. The higher discriminant rate belongs to a party that has more distinctive supporters. Discriminant rate, which shows the extent to which each party's voters are distinct to that party based on the discriminant functions, is also calculated. Please see Appendix for figures showing the results of the analyses.

In comparison to manifest analysis, or policy position analysis based on expert surveys, CDA reveals the party competition structure according to voters' preferences. There are several conflict dimensions that could explain the party competition structure in a party system.

### **1) The Green Party and the 2006 Czech election**

The Green Party was located by voters at the center-right position, overlapping with the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL) (Appendix, Figure in app-24. Here after "app-24"). This position was occupied by the "Coalition" in previous elections, meaning the electoral coalition between KDU-ČSL and the Free Union (app-17). As seen from the left-right axis, the Green Party replaced the Free Union (app-24). Self-placement of voters culminated in the middle of the left-right axis, smoothly extending to the right. Some electors of the Green Party located themselves exactly right (app-26). The Green Party's distribution of self-placement overlapped with that of KDU-ČSL.

As for CDA, in the Czech 2006 election, the most useful variable that distinguished

party attachment was "left-right" (app-27; app-28). In this discriminant function, the Green Party was situated at the second "most rightist" position. The most rightist party was ODS, and KDU-ČSL was on the left side. The second discriminant function was the combination of variables: membership in the catholic denomination, age, and employment status. On the basis of this discriminant function, only KDU-ČSL was separated from other parties. The Green Party was located on the opposite side to KDU-ČSL. The discriminant rate for the Green Party was as high as 60.71% (app-29). The Green Party was distinguished from parties other than KDU-ČSL by the left-right variable, and was distinguished from the KDU-ČSL by this second discriminant function.

The discriminant functions of the Czech 2006 election were the same as those in 2002 (app-20; app-27). Even though the Green Party was elected in the 2006 Czech elections, post-material variable, which is generally assumed to be related with the Green Party, was not selected in the discriminant function in this election.

## **2) TOP 09 and the Czech 2010 election**

On the left-right axis, TOP 09 was located in a position somewhat to the right, overlapping with ODS (app-30). The location of ODS was almost the same as it had been in the 2006 election. Self-placement of the party had shifted to the center. The distribution of the self-placement was concentrated at center point, peaking at the same point with ODS. TOP 09 had more centralists among its supporters than did the ODS.

The CDA shows that in the 2010 election too, group means for each party's supporters were spread separately on left-right variables (app-34). The TOP 09's place was distinguished from the position of the other parties.

However, on the second discriminant function, which consisted of variables including age, unemployment, education, and membership in the private sector, the parties were located quite closely and it was difficult to differentiate TOP 09 on the basis of this discriminant function. On the third discriminant function, variables as religious affiliation and denominational differences distinguished KDU-ČSL, but other social attribute variables were difficult to identify as the basis for discriminating the party attachment of the electorates.

The discriminant rate for TOP 09 was as low as 28.46% (app-35). Only the 26.92% of the electorate, who voted for TOP 09 in reality, were discriminated as supporters of the Civic Democrats. Discrimination between KDU-ČSL and Public Affairs was also difficult. KDU-ČSL – TOP 09's parent party – had as high a discriminant rate as 63.51% in the 2006 election, thanks to the denominational variables. In contrast to its parent party, TOP 09's discriminant rate was



low and pushed down other parties' discriminant rates as well.

The discriminant functions in the 2010 election did not change considerably (app-27; app-33). The function including denominational variables changed from the second function to the third, but the difference in importance between the third and the second is very small (0.098 and 0.090 respectively, app-27).

### **3) The Public Affairs (VV)**

The Public Affairs Party also won the parliamentary seats in the 2010 Czech election. It was located in the center-right position on the left-right axis, left of ODS and TOP 09 (app-28). In the 2006 election, KDU-ČSL and the Green Party were allocated this place. These two parties were judged more centrist in the 2010 election. Distribution of the self-placement of the supporters showed two peaks, one near the center and the other at center-right. The peak at the center overlapped with the right peak of the Social Democrats (app-32). Supporters' self-placement also overlapped with that of the TOP 09 supporters.

The CDA suggests that Public Affairs can be recognized by the left-right variables (app-34). For the second and third discriminant function it was difficult to distinguish voters' attachment to Public Affairs. The discriminant rate for Public Affairs was very low at 17.65%. This was the lowest rate in this election. Many of the persons who voted for Public Affairs were identified as the supporters of KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, ODS, and the Green Party.

### **4) The Freedom and Solidarity Party (SaS) and the Slovak 2010 election**

The Freedom and Solidarity Party was located on the left-right axis on the right side of center-right, next to the SDKU-DS (app-56). The Party position of SDKU-DS, the Freedom and Solidarity Party, and the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) overlapped. The distribution of voter self-placement was flat from center to right. It was difficult to find the differences among KDH, the Bridge Party, and the Hungarian Coalition Party.

In the 2010 Slovakian election, the first discriminant function consisted of linguistic variables, the second function consisted of left-right variables, and the third one consisted of age, unemployment, and church attendance variables (app-59). The Freedom and Solidarity Party distinguished itself at the second left-right function, located next to SDKU-DS and KDH. The third function suggested that the Freedom and Solidarity attachment was associated with less church attendance, youth, and employment. The discriminant rate was relatively high, at 56.1% (app-61). The discriminant rate of the Freedom and Solidarity was much higher than that for

SDKU-DS (27.94%) and Direction (35.17%).

According to the opinion poll conducted in February 2010 before the election, 31% of the Freedom and Solidarity supporters voted for SDKU-DS, 21% for the Direction, 11% abstained in the 2006 election and 21% had acquired voting rights for the first time for the 2010 election (Bútorová a Gyárfášová, 2010). Supporters of the Freedom and Solidarity Party were more accepting of diverse sexual orientation, the use of “soft” drugs, and abortion (Bútorová, Gyárfášová a Krivý 2010).

The Freedom and Solidarity Party received 307,287 votes (12.15%) in the 2010 election, but lost half of its votes, receiving 150,266 (5.88%) in the 2012 election<sup>4</sup>. According to the opinion poll after the election, about 55,300 former voters for Freedom and Solidarity voted for the Ordinary People, the newest party, in the 2012 election, and 67,400 members of the electorate abstained. On the other hand, 26,900 former SDKU-DS voters voted for Freedom and Solidarity in the 2012 election. It is presumed that some voters moved from older parties to new parties, and later, to even newer parties.

The discriminant functions in the Slovakian 2010 election changed from those in 2004 (app-60; app-52). The former election was carried out in 2006, but the data for this year was unavailable. In 2010, the first discriminant function consisted of linguistic variables. The cleavage between the Hungarian and the Slovakian voters strongly correlated with the voters' party attachment. In 2004, the Hungarian appreciation variable comprised the second discriminant function, together with urban residence and denomination (not Catholic). However, the correlation of this function to the party attachment was rather weak. The self-placement on the left-right axis was the strongest variable indicating satisfaction with the democratic regime and EU citizenship. The left-right self-placement was, in 2010 also, the second discriminant function on which parties located themselves, differentiating them from other parties.

## **5) The Bridge (Most-Híd) (Slovakia, 2010)**

The Bridge also won the parliamentary seats in the 2010 Slovak election. It was the offshoot party from the Hungarian Coalition Party. According to members of the electorate, this party was located at center-right on the left-right axis (app-56). But supporters of this party located it at the right end (app-57). Voters' self-location was also in the position on the right. The distribution of voters' self-placement was similar to that of the supporters of Freedom and Solidarity (app-58).

CDA revealed that the Bridge and its parent party, the Hungarian Coalition Party could be recognized by the linguistic (ethnic) variables (app-60). But the second discriminant function

showed that the Bridge's supporters were slightly younger and more likely to be employed than the supporters of the parent party. The discriminant rate for the Bridge Party was relatively high at 50%, but it was difficult to distinguish between voters for the Bridge Party and those for the Hungarian Coalition Party. According to the opinion poll, 58% of the Bridge's voters voted for the Hungarian Coalition Party in the 2006 election, and 18% of the Bridge's voters gained voting rights for the first time (Bútorová a Gyárfášová, 2010).

### **3. Case analysis**

From this analysis, how can we interpret the new parties' effect on party competition structure and coalition politics? This question is addressed in the discussion below.

#### **1) Party competition structure**

As far as party competition structure is concerned, the discriminant functions and the variables included did not change considerably, even though relatively large new parties had entered the party systems. The left-right self-placement axis correlated strongly with voters' party attachment in both countries, in every election.

The persistence of the Czech party competition structure deserves attention. The Green party did not add new conflict dimensions to Czech party politics. This may explain the Green Party's failure in the subsequent election. It was not based on the post-modern value orientation of the electorate, as in Western Europe. The Green Party was supported by the electors whose self-placement was at center-right. Its economic policy orientation was liberal. The Green Party, as a new party, replaced the Free Union and was replaced by other new parties, such as the Public Affairs Party and TOP 09. The emergence of TOP 09 and the Public Affairs Party changed the party landscape. However these parties had only replaced former center-right parties on the existing conflict dimensions.

In Slovakia, the linguistic – ethnic – variable constituted the strongest discriminant function in 2010. This emerged as the important difference in comparison to analysis of the 2004 data. The Hungarian minority thought that their situation had deteriorated since the establishment of the coalition government of the Direction (Smer), the Slovakian National Party (SNS), and the Movement for the Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) in 2006 (Bútorová a Gyárfášová, 2010). Almost all the voters for the Hungarian Coalition Party were members of the Hungarian minority, and 70% of Bridge Party voters were also Hungarian. The emergence of the Bridge Party could be related to the prominence of the linguistic variables.

In addition, in Slovakia, the third discriminant function which consisted of age, employment, and church attendance worked to distinguish new parties. The function which consisted of religion and pension variables had existed in the 2004 analysis. The third function used in 2010 had religious and work status variables in common, but the age variable emerged as the most important one. The difference between the new party and its parent party was recognizable by this function. New parties – the Bridge Party and the Freedom and Solidarity Party – tended to be supported by the younger generation, who were highly paid, employed in larger numbers, and less earnest about going to church. It is interesting to note that members of the electorate were not motivated to support the new party on the basis of economic hardship.

As far as these five new parties are concerned, the party competition structure in the Czech Republic has hardly been influenced. In Slovakia, the linguistic dimension, added to the cultural and economic dimensions, changed the components of the party competition structure with the emergence of new parties.

## **2) Coalition politics**

All five parties took part in governing coalitions after the elections. Did this mean they took the initiative in the creation of the new governing coalition? The Green Party's emergence certainly coincided with the change in coalition politics. Till the election of 2002, the Czech coalition politics had displayed a partially alternating pattern with three poles. Center-right Parties had formed governing coalitions with either left Social Democrats or right Civic Democrats. The 2006 election was the turning point for Czech coalition politics. Two blocks of left and right were formed, including the Green Party in the right block. The formation of the two blocks was mainly caused by the approximation of the Communists and the Social Democrats, along with an embittered relationship between the KDU-ČSL and the Social Democrats. The Green Party chose the center-right coalition as the result of these circumstances and did not cause the change in coalition politics.

TOP 09 and Public Affairs did not affect the two-block pattern of coalition politics. Those parties replaced the KDU-ČSL and the Green party in the center-right position and participated in a coalition with the Civic Democrats. The same trend was seen in the case of the two new Slovakian parties. In spite of the change in party competition structure, the left and right governing coalition remained unchanged. Two coalition blocks fully alternate.

The party positions on the left-right axis also suggest these coalition patterns. The positions of TOP 09 and the Public Affairs Party consolidated the right block (app-30) and so did the Bridge Party and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (app-56). The position of the two offshoot

parties was very near to their parent parties.

#### 4. Conclusion

Our five cases show that new parties do not always change party competition structures, and coalition patterns remain the same even when the party competition structure changes. Contrary to general assumptions, parties of this type do not directly cause instability within the party system and coalition politics. These five new parties are characteristic of new types of parties in East-Central Europe, especially in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia. High electoral volatility caused by the "supply side effect" of new parties has been getting attention because of the possibility of the party politics turmoil affected by the continuous emergence of new parties. However, as we have shown in this article, about half of these constantly emerging new parties do not always cause changes in the party competition structure and generally, they keep the coalition pattern unchanged.

On the other hand, we suggest that these parties may cause the following three indirect outcomes: unclear ex-post accountability, voter disappointment, and instability of coalition governments. Where accountability is concerned, governing parties are appreciated or punished by voters according to voters' judgment of government's political achievements up to the elections. This is the government's ex-post accountability as measured by the voters. When new parties got support in an election, the ex-post accountability of the governing coalition became unclear. The uncertainty is more evident in cases in which new parties join the coalition with former governing parties, as in the case of TOP 09 and the Public Affairs Party. The Ordinary People Party in the 2012 Slovakian election also fell into this category. TOP 09 and the Ordinary People Party were formed by the split of coalition parties, which re-entered the coalition after the election. These new parties hindered clear accountability of the coalition government. Voters could be disappointed by the new parties' policy after the election.

In the case of new parties, voters' self-placement was widely distributed on the left-right axis. As for Public Affairs, the distribution line had two peaks. The Freedom and Solidarity Party's supporters were distributed from center-left to center-right. New parties discriminant rates were generally low, and this affected discriminant rates of the older parties. In the 2002 and 2006 Czech elections, all the parties except the Social Democrats had discriminant rates of more than 60%. The discriminant rate decreased in the 2010 election. More than half of the parties got only one-third of previous rate (app-35). The Communist Party was scarcely affected, and the Civic Democrats still kept 58% of the discriminant rate, but the Social Democrats' rate went down to 28%. Voters' perceptions of the parties' plans may be widely

different from the actual direction which new parties take after elections.

New parties' willingness to enter the governmental coalitions with older parties could be especially disappointing for the voters. New parties attack old parties for corruption or poor governance during electoral campaigns. Sikk suggested that some types of new parties do not represent new issues or ideologies but just win elections by projecting the image of "newness" (Sikk 2011). The voters for the new parties chose them to show their disapproval of the existing parties or of government politics. But their choice was not reflected in the composition of the new coalition.

As one of the effects, some of the new parties lost popularity in a short time. The New Citizens Alliance, the Green Party, and Public Affairs Party entered into coalition governments with high levels of popularity but they lost popularity at the end of their governments<sup>5</sup>. On the other hand, the Freedom and Solidarity Party and TOP 09 showed popularity persistence, even though the former group lost half of its former voters. The reason why new parties in East-Central Europe are inclined to have short lives needs more investigation.

When new parties lost popularity, this damaged popular support for the coalition government. Unpopular new parties often lost integrity and lost their deputies to the opposition. These occurrences may cause instability for the governing coalitions in these countries.

An important point is that these indirect outcomes are closely connected to the stability of the party competition structure and coalition politics. This article's conclusion is still tentative, as the in-depth investigation has been limited to five cases in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Still, it is clear that there exist new types of new parties in East-Central Europe, a reality that needs special consideration to determine the real significance of their emergence.

## Notes

The original version of this article was prepared for the 7th ECPR General Conference 2013 in Bordeaux, France 4-7 September 2013 (Panel: Party Governments in Central and Eastern Europe: Challenging Conventional Wisdom). We thank Prof. Dr. Marc Debus for his constructive comments. We are also grateful for the anonymous referees from the Meiji Gakuin review -International & regional studies for their helpful comments.

- 1 The Election Database in Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries is a comprehensive database on parliamentary elections, presidential elections, and European elections. It contains the background information by experts on political parties and elections.  
[http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/election\\_europe/index.html](http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/election_europe/index.html).
- 2 As Sikk pointed out, Italy and Japan are the two old democracies that have produced numerous new parties since the 1990s. Japanese new parties are too numerous to count. Most of them are established as new offshoot parties. The names of the new parties show that founders of new parties tried to emphasize their newness: New Party Sakigake (SAKIGAKE: Forerunner), New Frontier Party (SHINSHINTO), Japan Renewal Party (SINSEITO), Sunrise Party of Japan (TACHIAGARE NIPPON: Stand up Japan), People's

Life First, Tomorrow Party of Japan (MIRAI no TO: Future Party). The effects of new parties on coalition governments are real in Japan, where three new parties gained more than a quarter of votes in proportional representation constituencies in the 2012 parliamentary election. In Italy and East-Central Europe, voters can locate new parties on the left-right axis. In Japan, voters have difficulty in locating parties on the left-right axis. On the Japanese party scene, there are no serious leftist parties. We can see the Polish-style right versus right politics in Japan.

- 3 Canonical Discriminant Analysis (CDA) consists of a variety of multivariate statistical techniques to be conducted for the purpose of estimating canonical discriminant functions (CDFs), which describe separation among groups based on some linear composites (discriminant variables) of the outcome variables. CDA may also properly classify cases into the groups and provide the absolute and relative magnitude of different discriminant variables. For technical details, see Klecka (1980) and Huberty (2010). For examples of the application to comparative politics, see Knutsen (1989).

As for data, the following were used: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 1,2,3, European Election Studies (EES) 2004, 2009, and European Values Survey (EVS), European Values Survey (EVS), World Values Survey (WVS) 1999/2000.

- 4 Kam zmizli v roku 2012 voliči pravice? Zostali doma, 13.VI.2013, SME,  
<http://www.sme.sk/c/6770254/kam-zmizli-v-roku-2012-volici-pravice-zostali-doma.html>
- 5 Party preference in Czech Republic: opinion poll by SANEP,  
<http://www.volebni-preference.cz/volebni-preference/>  
Party preference in Slovakia, opinion poll by Focus,  
<http://www.focus-research.sk/?section=show&id=10>

## References

- Barnea, Shlomit and Gideon Rahat. 2010. "'Out with the Old, In with the 'New'": What Constitutes a New Party?", *Party Politics*, 17(3), 303-320.
- Balík, Stanislav a Vlastimil Havlík a kol. 2011. *Koaliční vládnutí ve střední Evropě (1990-2010)*, Brno: IIPS.
- Bútorová, Zora a Oľga Gyárfášová. 2010. Slovensko pred parlamentnými voľbami, 12.3.2010,  
<http://www.ivo.sk/6241/sk/vyskum/slovensko-pred-parlamentnymi-volbami>
- Bútorová Zora, Oľga Gyárfášová a Vladimír Krivý. 2010. Výskum voličské hospřavania na Slovensku, 7.10.2010,  
<http://www.ivo.sk/6242/sk/vyskum/vyskum-volicskeho-spravania-na-slovensku>
- Eibl, Otto. 2011. *Politický prostor a témata v České republice v letech 2006-2008*, Brno: CDK.
- Gyárfášová, Oľga and Vladimír Krivý. 2007. "Electoral Behaviour: Persistent Volatility or Clear Signs of Consolidation? The Case of Slovakia", in Hloušek and Chytilék 2007, 79-107.
- Hino, Airo. 2012. *New Challenger Parties in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge.
- Haček, Miro. 2009. "Understanding Politics in Slovenia: Constitutional corporatism and Politico-administrative Relations", in Johannsen and Pedersen 2009, 98-116.
- Hloušek, Vít and Roman Chytilék (eds.) 2007. *Parliamentary Elections and Party Landscape in the Visegrád Group Countries*, Brno: CDK.
- Huberty, Carl J. 2010. 'Discriminant Analysis,' in Hancock Gregory R. and Ralph O. Mueller eds. *The Reviewer's Guide to Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences*, Routledge.
- Hug, Simon. 2001. *Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1998. "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems", *World Politics*, 40: 194-234.
- Johannsen, Lars and Karin Hilmer Pedersen (eds.) 2009. *Pathways - A Study of Six Post-Communist Countries*, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

- Klecka, William R. 1980. *Discriminant Analysis* (Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences), Sage Publications.
- Knutsen, Oddbjørn. 1989. "Cleavage Dimensions in Ten West European Countries: A Comparative Empirical Analysis", *Comparative Political Studies*, 21, 495-533.
- Lewis, Paul G. 2006. "Party Systems in Post-communist Central Europe: Patterns of Stability and Consolidation", *Democratization*, 13(4), 562-583.
- Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction", in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross National Perspectives*, New York: Free Press, 1-64.
- McAllister, Ian and Stephen White. 2007. "Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Societies", in *Party Politics*, 13(2), 197-216.
- Powell, Eleanor Neff and Joshua A. Tucker. 2013. "Revisiting Electoral Volatility in Post-Communist Countries: New Data, New Results and New Approaches", *British Journal of Political Science*, April, 1-25.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. 2010. "Politics in Croatia since 1990", in Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 235-257.
- Rose, Richard. 2009. *Understanding Post-Communist Transformation: A Bottom up Approach*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Rose, Richard and Neil Munro. 2009. *Parties and Elections in New European Democracies*, Colchester: ECPR Press.
- Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 2010. "A Supply-demand Model of Party-system Institutionalization: The Russian Case", *Party Politics*, 16(6), 801-821.
- Sanchez, Omar. 2009. "Party Non-Systems: A Conceptual Innovation", *Party Politics*, 15(4), 487-520.
- Sikk, A. 2005. "How Unstable? Volatility and the Genuinely New Parties in Eastern Europe", *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3), 391-412.
- Sikk, Alan. 2011. "Newness as a Winning Formula for New Political Parties", *Party Politics*, 18(4), 465-486.
- Tavits, Margit. 2008a. "Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(1), 113-133.
- Tavits, Margit. 2008b. "On the Linkage between Electoral Volatility and Party System Instability in Central and Eastern Europe," *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(5), 537-555.
- Tavits, Margit. 2008c. "Policy Positions, Issue Importance, and Party Competition in New Democracies", *Comparative Political Studies*, 41: 48-72.
- Tavits, Margit. 2012. "Party Organizational strength and party unity in post-communist Europe", *European Political Science Review*, 4(3), 409-431.

## Acknowledgement

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 23530142.

## Abbreviation list for the Appendix

<Political Parties in the Czech Republic>

ČSSD: Česká strana sociálně demokratická (The Czech Social Democratic Party)

KDU-ČSL: Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová (The Christian and democratic Union)

KSČM: Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

ODA: Občanská demokratická aliance (The Civic Democratic Alliance)



ODS: Občanská demokratická strana (The Civic Democratic Party)  
SPR-RSČ: Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Československa (Association for Republic - the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia)  
SZ: Strana zelených (Green Party)  
TOP09: TOP 09 (TOP 09)  
US: Unie svobody (Union of Freedom)  
VV: Věci veřejné (Public Affairs)  
SPO: Strana Práv Občanů - Zemanovci (Party of Civic Rights – Zeman's people)

<Political Parties in Slovakia>

ANO: Aliancia nového občana (Alliance of New Citizens)  
DS: Demokratická strana (Democratic Party)  
DÚ: Demokratická únia Slovenska (Democratic Union of Slovakia)  
KDH: Kresťansko-demokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement)  
KSS: Komunistická strana Slovenska (Communist Party of Slovakia)  
HZDS: Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)  
HZDS-LU: Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko - Ludová únia (Movement for Democratic Slovakia - People's Union)  
ES-HZDS: Ludová strana - Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (People's Party—Movement for Democratic Slovakia)  
MOST-HÍD: MOST-HÍD (Bridge)  
SaS: Sloboda a Solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity)  
SDK: Slovenská demokratická koalícia (The Slovak Democratic Coalition)  
SDKÚ-DS: Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia - Demokratická strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union and Democratic Party)  
SDL: Strana demokratickej ľavice (Party of the Democratic Left)  
SOP: Strana občianskeho porozumenia (Party of Civil Understanding)  
SMER: SMER (Direction)  
SMER-SD: SMER - sociálna demokracia (Direction-Social Democracy)  
SMK: Maďarská koalícia/Magyar Koalíció (Hungarian Coalition)  
SMK-MKP: Strana maďarskej koalície-Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Party of the the Hungarian Coalition)  
SNS: Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party)


**Appendix**

**Data and Software**

- Countries: Bulgaria, Czech, Romania and Slovakia
- Data: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems(CSES) 1, 2, 3, European Election Studies(EES) 2004, 2009 and European Values Survey(EVS)/World Values Survey(WVS) 1999/2000
- Single Dimensional Party Competition by Left-Right placement
- Multi-Dimensional Party Competition Structure estimated using Canonical Discriminant Analysis
- Statistical Software: Stata 13SE

app-2

**CSES 1996 Party Position by all respondents and Size(% of votes)**



app-4

**New Parties' Effects on the Instability of Coalition Governments in East-Central Europe**

**Appendix: Tables and Figures**


Mizuho NAKADA-Amiya  
and  
Takashi NARIHIRO

app-1


**CSES 1 Czech (1996)**

Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all respondents,  
by voters of the party, and  
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the party  
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis


app-3




app-5




app-6




app-7




app-8




app-10



app-12



app-9




app-11

### Canonical Structure

	F1	F2	F3	F4
strongleader	0.7887608	-0.1287116	-0.464888	-0.0847833
age	-0.184761	-0.0832939	-0.0864884	0.2382868
education	0.1614235	-0.0989659	0.2686024	-0.1727541
employment4	-0.1294807	-0.0982808	-0.0157856	0.3221708
v20_ppp	0.1896858	0.0063205	-0.1333089	-0.238882
denomination1	4.07E-08	0.2735218	-0.1540964	0.4610727
reserve	-0.337182	-0.7489449	0.0397848	-0.0392538
v191_4	0.2949874	-0.0194583	0.1604026	-0.3271951
democracy	-0.2224377	0.2856599	-0.0837925	-0.4273943
pastgov	-0.7076303	0.0088432	-0.4677046	-0.0084128
strongleader	0.2082602	-0.2348371	0.0820548	-0.1401053
union	-0.182241	-0.2862449	-0.1092927	0.1361286
ecogroup	0.044735	0.0547288	0.1387804	0.2893885
o4b	0.1895359	-0.0893877	0.1658433	0.1384676
o4b	-0.2113746	0.011111	-0.0477385	0.0145865
immigrant1	0.1948128	-0.0339832	0.0884633	-0.0145075
L-R	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
past regime bad	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
high social class	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
materialist	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
disatisfied with democracy	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
highly educated	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
past regime bad	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
Catholic	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
environmental activist	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
lower income	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
olier	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
authoritarian leader support	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
frequent church attendance	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
R-L	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
disatisfied with democracy	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
highly educated	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
past regime bad	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
materialist	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
environmental activist	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
lower income	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075
olier	0.1948128	0.2856599	0.0884633	-0.0145075

app-13



app-15

### Meaning of "Left and Right" : Correlation with Self-Placement in Czech and Romania

	Czech (WVS99)	Romania (WVS99)
individual responsibility vs state responsibility	-0.2757	-0.0949
freedom of corporation or stronger regulation	-0.2629	-0.224
satisfaction with democracy	-0.2801	-0.1207
democracy best government /not income equality significant / not significant	-0.3129	-0.0738
	0.3154	0.1882


LR scdca has stronger correlation with view on economy and democracy in Czech Republic than in Romania.

app-14


### CSES 2 Czech (2002)

Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all respondents,  
by voters of the party, and  
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the party  
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis


app-16




app-17




app-18



app-19



app-20



app-21

### Classification Table in CDA


	CSSD	ODS	KSCM	US-DEU & KDU-CSL	Total
CSSD	104	14	27	17	162
ODS	64.2	8.64	16.67	10.49	100
KSCM	10	88	0	14	112
US-DEU & KDU-CSL	8.93	78.57	0	12.5	100
Total	18.58	21	0	89	113
	11	19	3	53	86
	12.79	22.09	3.49	61.63	100
	146	121	119	87	473
	30.87	25.58	25.16	18.39	100

app-22


### CSES 3 Czech (2006, 2010)

Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all respondents,  
by voters of the party, and  
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the party  
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis


app-23




app-24




app-25



app-26



app-27



app-28




### Classification Table in CDA

	ODS	CSSD	SZ	KSCM	KDU-CSL	
ODS	216	62	1	45	332	
	65.06	2.41	18.67	0.3	13.55	100
CSSD	10	129	50	77	40	306
	3.27	42.16	16.34	25.16	13.07	100
SZ	15	6	51	3	9	84
	17.86	7.14	60.71	3.57	10.71	100
KSCM	4	22	4	118	8	156
	2.56	14.1	2.56	75.64	5.13	100
KDU-CSL	7	7	11	2	47	74
	9.46	9.46	14.86	2.7	63.51	100


CSSD supporter discriminant rate is the worst, possibly because CSSD is the centrist and gathering votes from broad voters.

app-29

### Czech 2010 Party Position and Size(% of votes)




CSES3 Czech (2010) lower chamber: L-R Party Position by Electorates




Voters who voted KSCM, CSSD, TOP09 or ODS locate themselves more moderate than the party they voted.

app-31

2010 Czech: IR self-placement by all voter and voted for each party



app-32




app-34

### CSES3 Czech 2010 CDA (response=party choice)

Eigenvalues	2.1744	0.088099	0.00471
Prob>F	0	0	0.0001
f1	12	0	0
age	0.244822	<b>0.719414</b>	-0.1191561
gender1	-0.023592	0.20762	0.00119172
education	-0.1781088	<b>0.358893</b>	0.0249064
union1	0.024522	0.0979469	0.1180233
farmer1	0.0047839	-0.0256225	0.0827712
notemployed	-0.0687168	<b>-0.6761379</b>	0.0400979
socioecon1	-0.105425	0.1530497	-0.1426498
eseter1	0.146804	<b>0.261529</b>	0.237481
income	-0.2113858	-0.0381469	-0.085851
denom2	0.029798	0.0379912	<b>-0.973977</b>
denom3	-0.027983	-0.1747377	<b>0.810078</b>
unrurban	-0.0144007	-0.0085535	0.0882215
democracy	0.232709	-0.147402	-0.0488234
self	<b>-0.817685</b>	0.0402957	0.0839857

L-R: age, active worker, highly educated, private sector  
 non-Catholic, atheist

app-33




app-36

On the whole the discriminant rates are lower than those of 2006. Especially the DRs of new parties (VV and Top09) are. The exceptions are the parties which has ideologically reliable supporters (KDU-CSL and KSCM).

	VV	KSCM	CSSD	SPO	TOP09	KDU-CSL	SZ	Sovereignty	ODS
VV	18	17.65	0	4	3	14	20	12	16
KSCM	1	3.92	2.84	13.73	19.61	11.76	15.69	14.71	15.69
CSSD	1.11	<b>68.89</b>	14.44	2.22	0	4	3	4	4
SPO	3	63	57	14	1	24	18	19	19
TOP09	1.48	31.34	<b>28.56</b>	6.97	0.5	11.94	8.86	8.45	1
KDU-CSL	0	0	27.27	<b>31.82</b>	7	3	1	2	2
SZ	0	0	2	3	37	20	10	5	35
Sovereignty	13.85	0	1.54	2.31	<b>28.46</b>	15.38	7.69	3.85	26.92
ODS	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	2
	0	2	1	1	2	3	8	2	1
	0	10	5	5	10	15	<b>40</b>	10	5
	3	1	1	4	1	2	2	5	2
	14.29	4.76	19.05	4.76	9.52	23.81	9.52	23.81	9.52
	18	0	2	2	19	19	5	96	96
	10.84	0	1.2	1.2	11.45	11.45	3.01	3.01	<b>57.85</b>


app-35



app-37



app-38




app-39


### Classification Table

TRUE	ODS	CSSD	SZ	KSCM	KDU-CSL	Total
ODS	20	58.82	2.94	23.53	2.94	11.76
CSSD	5	7.81	34.38	6	14	17
SZ	1	8.33	1	9.38	21.88	26.56
KSCM	8.33	0	0	10	0	0
KDU-CSL	0	0	0	83.33	0	0
	0	0	0	2	17	0
	0	0	0	10.53	89.47	0
	3	3	3	2	0	17
	12	12	12	8	0	68


app-40




app-41



app-42



app-43



app-44

### Group means in CDA




app-45

### Classification Table

	DS	DU	HZDS	KSS	KDH	SNS	SDL	SMK	SOP	SDK	Total
DS	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	13
DU	38.46	7.69	0	0	0	7.69	0	7.69	15.38	0	23.08
HZDS	8.33	16.67	2	8.33	0	16.67	0	8.33	16.67	0	48
KSS	2	7	20	20	22	10	20	9.7	9	10	111
KDH	1.8	6.31	18.02	19.82	9.01	18.02	6.31	8.11	9.01	9.01	3.6
SNS	1	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	10
SDL	10	10	0	0	80	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMK	7	4	3	6	28	4	1	5	5	2	65
SOP	10.77	6.15	4.62	9.23	43.08	6.15	1.54	7.69	7.69	3.08	3.08
SDK	6.25	0	14.58	6.25	4.17	33.33	1.16	7	2	5	48
Total	3	3	2	7	1	6	34	4	5	4	69
	4.33	4.33	2.9	10.14	1.45	8.71	49.28	5.8	7.25	5.8	48
	25	10.42	8.33	8.33	8.33	0	16.67	4.17	10.42	4.17	48
	3	3	9	2	1	9	6	4	8	6	51
	5.88	5.88	17.65	3.92	1.96	17.65	11.76	7.84	15.69	11.76	94
	15.96	9.57	2.13	2.13	10.64	3.19	7.45	3.19	9.57	36.17	34
	52	35	48	54	59	64	39	44	44	61	521
	9.88	6.72	9.21	10.36	11.32	12.48	12.28	7.49	8.45	11.71	

app-46

### Slovakia 2004 Party Position and Size(% of votes)




app-48


### EES 2004 Slovakia (2004)

Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all respondents,  
by voters of the party, and  
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the party  
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis


app-47




app-49



app-50



app-51



app-52

### Classification Table


vi	ANO	HZD	HZDS-LU	KDH	KSS	SDKU	SMER	SMK	SNS
ANO	1667	4.76	2.38	14.29	4.76	16.67	9.52	16.67	14.29
HZD	2	8	0	1	3	2	0	0	1
HZDS-LU	11.76	47.06	0	5.88	17.65	11.76	0	0	5.88
KDH	6	12	25	5	16	0	7	13	21
KSS	5.71	11.43	23.81	4.76	15.24	0	6.67	12.38	20
SDKU	1	7	2	18	0	5	1	10	3
SMER	2.13	14.89	4.26	38.3	0	10.64	2.13	21.28	6.38
SMK	0	0	3	0	25	1	3	1	4
SNS	0	0	8.11	0	67.57	2.7	8.11	2.7	10.81
Total	14	7	5	21	3	37	3	14	7
ANO	12.61	6.31	4.5	18.92	2.7	33.33	2.7	12.61	6.31
HZD	11	21	5	6	11	6	10	17	22
HZDS-LU	10.09	19.27	4.59	5.5	10.09	5.5	9.17	15.6	20.18
KDH	3.77	3.77	1.89	15.09	13.21	11.32	0	50.94	0
KSS	4	1	2	1	1	0	2	2	10
SDKU	17.39	4.35	8.7	4.35	0	8.7	43.48	8.7	43.48
SMER	43	66	58	78	69	63	47	50	82
SMK	7.73	11.87	10.43	14.03	12.41	11.33	8.45	8.99	14.75

app-53

## CSES 3 Slovakia (2010)

Party Position on the Left-Right Axis by all respondents,  
by voters of the party, and  
Self-placement on the LR Axis by voters of the party  
and Canonical Discriminant Analysis


app-55




app-54

## Slovakia 2010 Party Position and Size(% of votes)


Clear difference between the left and the right coalition partners.  
Size of the extreme party on both sides are the largest.  
There is little difference between the average self-placement position of voters within coalition partner supporters.




app-56



app-58



app-60



app-57

CSES3 Slovakia 2010 CDA (response=party choice)

age	-0.0146782	0.1635271	-0.6008512
gender1	0.0090754	-0.0261337	0.2959398
education	-0.0691021	-0.0581804	0.2929435
union1	0.0194071	-0.0282144	-0.0710431
lang1	0.9925074	0.1288392	-0.009581
lang4	-0.091978	-0.1613897	0.0529633
unemployment	-0.002248	0.1651893	-0.442188
sector1	-0.0083916	-0.0418861	-0.2157685
income	-0.0728652	-0.251127	0.4292166
reliservice	-0.0269198	-0.0713804	-0.7475913
democracy	0.0054566	0.1180138	-0.2034848
ruralurban	-0.0810121	-0.0869237	0.1584441
self	0.1807208	-0.9176852	-0.0274049

app-59



### Classification Table in CDA

	KDH	LS-HZDS	Most-Hid	SaS	SDKU-DS	SNS	Smer-SD	SMK
KDH	33	2	0	3	6	6	3	0
LS-HZDS	66	4	0	6	12	6	6	0
Most-Hid	0	75	0	1	0	1	0	0
SaS	0	0	29	2	2	12.5	0	100
SDKU-DS	0	0	50	3.45	3.45	3.45	0	39.66
SNS	1	1	0	23	10	4	2	0
Smer-SD	2.44	2.44	0	56.1	24.39	9.76	4.88	0
SMK	19	1	3	17	19	6	3	0
	27.94	1.47	4.41	25	27.94	8.82	4.41	0
	10	10	0	1	0	4	3	0
	26	51	2	22	11	41	83	0
	11.02	21.61	0.85	9.32	4.66	17.37	35.17	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
	0	0	30	0	0	0	0	70

Discriminant rates for parties within the coalition government are low.

app-61

### References

- Klecka, William R. (1980) *Discriminant Analysis* (Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences), Sage Publications.
- Huberty, Carl J. (2010) "Discriminant Analysis," in Hancock Gregory R. and Ralph O. Mueller eds. *The Reviewer's Guide to Quantitative Methods in the Social Sciences*, Routledge.
- Knutsen, Oddbjørn (1989) "Cleavage Dimensions in Ten West European Countries: A Comparative Analysis," *CPS*, vol.21, 495-533.
- Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD), *European Election Database* ([http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/index.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/index.html))
- Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell and Ian McAallister(2011) 'Citizens and their Party Policy Preferences' in their *Political Parties & Democratic Linkage*, Oxford University Press.

app-62

- The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ([www.cses.org](http://www.cses.org)). CSES MODULE 1 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor]. August 4, 2003.
- The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ([www.cses.org](http://www.cses.org)). CSES MODULE 2 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. June 27, 2007.
- The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems ([www.cses.org](http://www.cses.org)). CSES MODULE 3 FULL RELEASE [dataset]. March 27, 2013 version.
- EES (2009). *European Parliament Election Study 2009* [Voter Study and/or Candidate Study, and/or Media Study, and/or Euromanifesto Study, and/or Contextual Data], [Advance/Final] Release, DD/MM/2010. ([www.pired.eu](http://www.pired.eu)).
- An Expert Survey of 208 parties in Europe, used in Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield. 2012. *The Strain of Representation. How Parties represent diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (<http://party-competition.politics.ox.ac.uk/>)

app-63