International & Regional Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, No. 57, 25－48, October 2020

【Article】

Clerical Agency and the Formation of Buddhist Organizations in the Early Modern Period

Alexander Vesey

Abstract

Analyses of the Tokugawa shogunate's efforts to control Buddhist clerical organizations often begin with discussion of two governing mechanisms: the head-branch model for placing temples and their resident clerics into institutional hierarchies; and the liaison (*furegashira*) system for the effective promulgation of samurai laws and directives to clerics no matter where they resided. Although the Tokugawa state mandated the formation of these structures for administrative purposes, documents in temple archives show how elite and mid-level clerics did not passively submit to such ordering, but rather they asserted control over the formation of these structures in order to achieve their own objectives. Drawing on recent studies and data from a temple in Saitama Prefecture, this paper will highlight this aspect of early modern Buddhist history by studying conflicts between clerics as they coalesced into the head-branch and liaison systems. It will then conclude with a brief discussion of the status community implications that arose from the development of the head-branch and liaison systems.

To begin with a general observation, prior to the 1980s many scholarly accounts of Buddhism in 17th century Japan rested on a narrative of expanding samurai authority that quickly subsumed the clergy into the emerging political order defined by the Tokugawa house. This process began with the late 16th century hegemons Oda Nobunaga 織田信長 and Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 who combined political pressure and the force of arms to eradicate Buddhist political and martial power that had evolved in response to the social tumult of the Kamakura and Muromachi periods. The narrative then shifts to the first Tokugawa Shogun Ieyasu 徳川家康 and his advisors who further subordinated Buddhism through a regime of regulation.[1] Ieyasu initially applied this method with localized codes (*hatto* 法度) in his Kantō domain, but after 1603 his nascent shogunate gradually imposed regulations upon major Kyoto temples as well. The rate of issuance then increased dramatically between 1613-1615, a time when the Tokugawa and Toyotomi families intensified their struggle for power.[2] These documents stressed adherence to monastic training regimens, the maintenance of clerical propriety, and an implicit political message that the Buddhist

clergy should only focus on spiritual development. Furthermore, one key figure in this regulatory process was Isshin Sūden 一心崇伝 (1569-1633), the abbot of Konchiin 金地院 sub-temple at Kyoto's Nanzenji 南禅寺. A Zen cleric with an insider's understanding of Kyoto politics, Sūden entered Ieyasu's service as an advisor in 1608.[3] He oversaw the creation of many codes, and even though the shogunate eventually adopted a more bureaucratic approach to governing religious schools by creating a temple and shrine magistracy (*jisha bugyō* 寺社奉行) after Sūden's death in 1633, his activities laid the ground work for subsequent Tokugawa policies. According to Tsuji Zennosuke's seminal interpretation of these events, Buddhism's inclusion within the Tokugawa order resulted in sectarian formalization (*keishikika* 形式化) that ultimately contributed to the clergy's moral decline (*daraku* 堕落).[4] This perspective has been mirrored for English readers in works such as Kitagawa 1966 (which was reprinted in 1990).

There is no denying the fact that once independent Buddhist temples were enveloped by the emerging polity of the Tokugawa shogunate and other daimyo (large land-holding samurai houses that pledged their loyalty to the Tokugawa). However, analyses of Nankōbō Tenkai's 南光坊天海 (1536?-1643) role in the formulation of the Tōshō Gongen 東照権現 cult that deified Ieyasu (Ooms 1985; Boot, 2000) and the studies of Sūden cited above strongly indicate that political subordination did not enervate clerical influence over the formation of early modern Buddhism. That is to say, Tokugawa Ieyasu's approach to governance acknowledged the authority of other power holders as long as they did not threaten his house. This point is reflected in recent studies of negotiations of power between the Tokugawa house and daimyo who exercised their own spheres of authority (Brown 2012). Examples of this interplay also appear in recent research on the court in Kyoto. In 1615, the shogunate issued a code of conduct for the nobility, but it consisted of "unexceptional" articles that merely reiterated long accepted practices and standards (Butler 2002, 210-211). As such, the *act* of issuance formally affirmed Tokugawa domination, but in practice the regulation of aristocratic prerogatives provided a stable legal foundation for court and noble activities under the new regime. These continuities are evident in the socio-cultural influence exercised by the aristocracy's patronage of numerous religious communities (Takano 1989, 2014).[5] At the other end of the social spectrum, recent studies of early modern status (*mibun* 身分)-based practices among peasants, town dwellers and outcaste groups show how these communities continually utilized privileges and monopolies over specific products or activities to define their respective places within early modern society.[6]

In light of such studies, I argue there is a need for a more nuanced interpretation of early modern Buddhist agency that draws upon new insights gained from other areas of early modern social politics. According to this perspective, the samurai codes certainly reduced Buddhist independence, but Buddhist clerics nontheless took advantage of the complex nature of the

Tokugawa state to actively re-shape the organizations and identities of their respective schools. In order to examine the nature of clerical empowerment, I will look at the "head-branch" (*honmatsu* 本末) and "liaison-temple" (*furegashira* 触頭) systems that operated within every Buddhist school. These administrative networks generally receive passing mention in western studies, but Udaka Yoshiaki has produced extensive research on their internal structure and operations. In addition, Takano Toshihiko and Hōzawa Naohide have analyzed their role in clerical relations with the aristocracy and peasant communities respectively. Building upon this research, in this study I will provide brief overviews of each system, and then I will focus on examples of tension and conflict that erupted between temples as 17th and early 18th century clerics strove to fashion the networks that linked even the smallest temples to elite Buddhist clerics in Kyoto. This discussion will center on Kantō-area events for two reasons. Firstly, thanks to the local history boom of the 1970s and 1980s, there are extensive collections of temple documents that have been discovered and catalogued, and I will introduce a case based upon transcribed but little studied records from the central Saitama region. Secondly, focusing on events that occurred in relative proximity to Edo (the seat of the Tokugawa shogunate) will highlight the degree to which the shogunate accepted clerical agency within its own domain. Having discussed the internal dynamics of Buddhist institution building, I will then conclude by briefly considering the implications of these organizing activities on the definition and practice of Buddhist religious status identity in Tokugawa society.

Organizing the Buddhists

By recognizing the authority of specific temples with the early 17th century codes, the first shoguns and their advisors supported the creation of institutional building blocks around clusters of temple hierarchies, with each school being composed of least one. The best analogy for these entities is that of a large pyramid. (See Fig. 1) At the apex of each stood a headquarter (*honji* 本寺 or *honzan* 本山). Most traced their origins back to prominent Heian and Kamakura period clerics who founded Japan's major Buddhist traditions, with several exceptions such as the Ōbaku School's Manpukuji 万福寺 in Uji (1661) and Tenkai's Kan'eiji 寛永寺 in Edo (1620). Those in the Kansai area were known as *kamigata honji* 上方本寺, but the Sōtō school's Eiheiji 永平寺 and Sōjiji 総持寺 as well as various Nichiren and Jōdo shinshū school headquarters were in other regions. The highest Shingon 真言, Tendai 天台, Jōdo 浄土, and Jōdoshinshu 浄土真宗 temples were the seats of imperial or aristocratic abbots (*monzeki* 門跡), while the abbots of others were honored with court-bestowed purple robes. Even those not accorded such distinctions could still maintain ties with the aristocracy through the officials who liaised between the court and the shogunate (*buke tensō* 武家伝奏), or aristocrats who traditionally served as intermediaries

Fig. 1 The Organization of a Buddhist School Under the Tokugawa Bakufu



between specific temples and the court (*jisha tensō* 寺社伝奏, *shojigata tensō* 諸寺方伝奏) (Takano 1989, 132-155).

Each headquarter supervised tiers of branch institutions (*matsuji* 末寺) spread throughout the provinces. At the apex of these regional hierarchies were "rural head temples" (*inaka honji* 田舎本寺), because they had authority over their own branch systems. Going down to a third, fourth, or perhaps even a fifth sub-stratum, the head-branch model was repeated for an ever-increasing number of smaller temples situated in villages and towns. These linkages were sometimes characterized with familial terms like "direct branch" (*chokumatsu* 直末) and "grandchild branch" (*sonmatsu* 孫末) (Toyota 1982, 58; Kushida 1964, 1052). At the lowest stratum were *monto* 門徒 temples that were not accorded full "branch" status. They operated with limited economic resources and their abbots lacked advanced training credentials, hence they were not allowed to perform funerals or train disciples. Finally, there were sub-temples located within the precincts of larger institutions (*tatchū* 塔頭 or *shiin* 子院). Their origins varied: some started as residences for retired abbots, others were established by daimyo or aristocrats who desired a family memorial hall within the grounds of a major Buddhist complex. These cloisters were technically subdivisions of the parent temple and thus did not have the independent standing accorded to branches. Nonetheless, sub-temples could exert significant influence. The abbacy of a headquarters, for example, might rotate between certain sub-temple abbots (this was called a *rinban* 輪番 system). Others developed their own branch networks or became educational training centers. Such developments gave their abbots a degree of independence from other sub-temples and even the main temple to which they were attached.

The key point to these systems is that Buddhist network building drew upon the clergy's own traditions and practices (Sonehara 2006, 70-73). In some cases, large headquarters and regional temple connections were vestiges of Heian/medieval relationships in which branches originally functioned as local overseers of main temple lands in provinces outside Kyoto. Other institutional links evolved from personal ties between the abbot of a major monastery and disciples who founded smaller temples in other regions, often with the support of local samurai families. Within the Kantō, medieval era Shingon clerics from Tōji 東寺 began the structuring of temples in that school, and from the 1570s onwards Tendai temples coalesced into networks centered on Kawagoe's Naka-in 中院 (Udaka 1999, 430-436). These shifts occurred prior to Ieyasu's arrival in 1590 and had been accepted by ruling samurai families in the Kantō. Shogunate recognition of headquarters authority was thus an opportunistic adoption of pre-Tokugawa clerical practices that created a practical administrative strategy for relying upon highest temples authorities to handle subordinate branches.

In this respect the Tokugawa acceptance Buddhism's internal authorities was not unique.

In early modern Japan, the "house" (*ie* 家) became a fundamental building block of society (Mizubayashi 1987, 255-260; Bitō 1991, 373). The house reflected a familial model, but its members were not limited to blood relations. Instead, a house could include a range of people who were united by bonds of allegiance or who shared an investment in a particular occupation or activity. Houses generally centered on a patriarchal hierarchy, at the top of which was the "foundation of the house" (*iemoto* 家元). These leaders might be samurai daimyo who had varying degrees of autonomy over their own domains, or aristocrats in Kyoto who exercized authority over artistic pursuits. The Buddhist headquarters fulfilled this role for their respective schools. They defined their school's teachings, set sectarian training standards, and validated the "transmission of Buddhist Dharma (teaching)" (*denpō* 伝法) that substantiated a cleric's affiliation with their sacerdotal lineage.

Head-branch systemization was often a rather straightforward process of affirmation for temples with pre-1600 links, but when such ties were weak or non-extant, charismatic and aggressive clerics strove to assert their authority over the emerging ecclesiastic networks by taking advantage of the authority invested in them by the nascent Tokugawa state. Not surprisingly, the possibility of forced intra-school hierarchization produced tensions between clerics, and an abbot might try to forestall potential subordination by evoking evidence of provenance or origins (*yuisho* 由緒) that highlighted his temple's illustrious heritage. This defensive response could be based on sacerdotal lineage charts, creation tales (*engi* 縁起), personal letters and land titles, but inscribed objects (bells, cloth decorations, etc.) and even place names were also valued as sources of identity. The abbot's goal was to put forth enough local historical evidence to claim that his temple had a unique religious pedigree, hence it should not be subordinated. Modern scholars once dismissed *yuisho* as merely historically suspect documents that were created in response to socio-political exigencies. However, this stance has shifted since the 1980s as researchers developed more sophisticated historiographical methodologies. The once spurious *yuisho* are now studied for their insights on the emergence of localized historical consciousness and memory. On a practical level, historians also note that from the mid-18th century onwards commoner elites increasingly created and used *yuisho* that claimed historical links with Tokugawa Ieyasu in order to argue for exemptions from duties owed to samurai overlords.[7] Since *honmatsu* systemization occurred among temples of the same tradition, disputes over doctrine were not common, but as we shall see, 17th century Buddhist abbots invoked their temples' *yuisho* and historical memory in their struggles over the realignment of intra-school relationships.

The exemplar of early modern clerical agency was none other than Nankōbō Tenkai, who was particularly adept at drawing upon his personal relations with Ieyasu and the second shogun Hidetada 秀忠 to extend his religious and organizational authority over Tendai temples

in eastern Japan. Tenkai's rise to power was precipitated in the late 1500s by his installation at Kawagoe's Kita'in 喜多院—a move that placed him near Naka'in, a notable medieval Tendai training center (*SSKTa*, 714-716). Drawing upon his advantageous position, Tenkai initiated his campaign for control in 1613 with two sets of ordinances that mandated branch temple adherence to headquarter authority in a manner that institutionally separated Kantō-area Tendai temples from Enryakuji 延暦寺, the traditional center of the Tendai school near Kyoto (Date 1930, 333).[8]

Tenkai's plans gained further impetus when the Tokugawa founded Kan'eiji in 1624 as a prayer temple. Using it as an Edo base for extending his authority, Tenkai began to forge head—branch ties with other Tendai institutions in Musashi 武蔵 Province and beyond, sometimes in connection with the disbursement of Tokugawa land grants or the imposition of regulations.[9] The greatest result of his efforts came posthumously in 1655 when the Tokugawa finalized the establishment of eastern Tendai authority by establishing the practice of appointing imperial princes to the abbacy of Rinnōji 輪王寺, the Tendai temple that oversaw the main Tōshōgū shrine (*SSKTa,* 730-731).[10]

Tenkai's method for forming Tendai head-branch affiliations was one of divide and rule whereby he first split Tendai between east and west with Tokugawa support and then reorganized regional Tendai institutions to establish a new power base in the greater Kantō region. For small rural temples, inclusion within Tenkai's new order brought enhanced prominence, but some faced severe challenges to their own identity. Such was the case of Chōrakuji 長楽寺, an important temple in the upper Kantō that experienced firsthand the impact of Tenkai's grasp for religious control. Founded in the 13th century by Eichō 栄朝 (the fourth disciple of the prominent cleric Yōsai 栄西) with support from the Nitta 新田 samurai house, Chōrakuji was a center of Tendai esoteric and Zen training in the Kamakura period. However, from the 1300s onwards esoteric studies declined and the resident monks considered themselves to be Rinzai Zen clerics. Even though an ordination hall for esoteric initiations (*taimitsu kanjō* 台密灌頂) remained, by 1600 the Tendai legacy was for all practical purposes dormant.[11]

Chōrakuji felt the first effects of Tokugawa hegemony in 1594 when Ieyasu stripped the temple of its holdings following a land survey. Then, due to Ieyasu's efforts to (re-) construct his house's links to the Nitta clan that once ruled the area, Chōrakuji benefited from its own Nitta legacy when the shogunate gave it a 100 *koku* land grant in 1603.[12] Thirty-seven years later, Tenkai initiated his campaign to incorporate Chōrakuji within the Tendai head-branch system led by Kan'eiji. Taking advantage of Chōrakuji's empty abbacy in 1640, Tenkai nominally took that title for himself, and then ignored opposition from the temple's community to appoint a disciple named Kōkai 晃海 as abbot. Through this proxy, Tenkai strove to resurrect Chōrakuji's derelict Tendai past. In the ensuing litigation, both sides evoked different aspects of the same *yuisho*:

Tenkai and his factotum Kōkai drew up on the Tendai heritage while other clerics advocated Chōrakuji's Zen identity. Ieyasu's other Buddhist advisor Sūden had supported Chōrakuji's Zen identity, but this protection ended upon Sūden's death. With the building of a Tōshōgū shrine dedicated to Ieyasu in the precincts and further land grants, Tenkai and his successors at Kan'eiji eventually wore down the opposition and transformed this regional temple with a complex medieval legacy into a singularly Tendai site that venerated the Tokugawa.

The manipulation of heritage, history and politics was not limited to the highest ranks of Tendai, however, as the formation of head-branch relationships further down the school's hierarchy could be marked by equal acrimony. One such example covering a span of fifty-eight years involved Kichijōji 吉祥寺 (a branch temple of Naka'in) in Mimuro 三室, Musashi, and its own branch institution Jishōin 慈星院.[13] Difficulties began in 1587 when the Ōta 太田 clan (the family that ruled the region before the Tokugawa) placed Jishōin under Kichijōji's supervision. In an effort to reassert their temple's independence, Jishōin's abbot and his lay supporters filed a suit with Kan'eiji in 1645 claiming the temple was founded by Ennin 円仁, a prominent 9th century Tendai cleric; therefore, it should be given equal standing with Kichijōji. Unfortunately for Jishōin's advocates, higher Tendai authorities denied the petition by reaffirming the status quo between the litigants.

Such machinations were not unique to Tendai, a point brought out in a suit between Sokushōin 息障院, a large Shingi Shingon 新義真言宗 temple in Yoshimi 吉見 and the nearby Kongōin 金剛院 which occurred in 1622-1624.[14] Sokushōin had developed its branch temple networks over the 16th century, but Kongōin remained independent until Chishakuin 智積院 (the Kyoto based headquarters of both litigants) placed Kongōin under Sokushōin's jurisdiction in 1622. Angered by this decision, Kongōin continually rejected its subjugation to the emerging order. Sokushōin's abbot rebutted such recalcitrance with a further petition to Chishakuin to enforce the previous judgment. In the end, Kongōin remained a branch temple, and its indignant abbot was cast out of the Shingi Shingon system.

As the priests of both Kongōin and Jishōin discovered to their discomfort, the impetus of centralization generally overrode localized clerical desires; therefore, it was difficult to avoid or reverse decisions on head-branch relationships. It was not, however, entirely impossible, and Udaka Yoshiaki's research on Kantō-area Shingon history cites thirteen examples of politically adroit abbots who realigned their position by seeking direct head-branch ties with Kyoto *monzeki*. This tactic did not mean the compete rejection of hierarchization, but it did allow clerics gain a greater degree of relative independence by placing themselves under the protection of aristocratic clerics outside the Kantō. Most of these cases occurred in the later part of the 17th century, after the early wave of systemization had settled down (Udaka 1999, 139; *SSKTa*, 740). Ironically,

Sokushōin, which successfully defeated Kongōin's efforts to break the head-branch bond, sought to improve its own stature by seeking a new head temple. Up to the mid-1600s, Sokushōin had been a branch of Keisokuji 鶏足寺 (Udaka 1987, 117-120), but in 1686 it asked Shingon authorities in Edo to declare the relationship defunct because Keisokuji had declined as an important regional temple. Sokushōin then petitioned for new branch status with the Hōon'in 報恩院 cloister of the prominent *monzeki* temple Daigoji 醍醐寺 in Kyoto. The shogunate and Shingi authorities did not immediately grant permission, but by 1691 Sokushōin was formally accepted into Hōon'in's system.

While much of this ordering was top-down, there are instances where an abbot of the lowest level temple rank could apply to raise his institution to full branch rank. In Shingi Shingon, these temples were called *monto* 門徒,[15] and Sokushōin's printed records include petitions from twelve of them asking for advancement. The process involved a large gift in gold to Sokushōin and the acquisition of permission from other branches and the liaison officials in Edo, but there were several benefits. Even if he had fulfilled his school's training requirements, a *monto* abbot could not perform funerals, train disciples, or wear colorful robes because this temple's rank was too low. Advancement to branch stature removed these constraints and thus enhanced the successful abbot's socio-religious standing among other Buddhist clerics.[16]

Solidification Through Documentation: Recording the Ties that Bind

Key indices of this network building were the head–branch registers (*honmatsuchō* 本末帳) that were periodically compiled throughout the early modern era. Clerical authorities began submitting lists in 1632-1633 on shogunate orders, which they later supplemented with major revisions in 1692, 1745, and in the 1780s.[17] The earliest registers were of questionable value: most schools could only provide limited results, and there were no submissions from the Jōdo shinshū or Nichiren 日蓮 schools. Tamamuro Fumio has argued the scale of these submissions reveals the initial weakness of headquarter control over regional temple networks (Tamamuro 1971, 51). The head-branch disputes described above bear this out, as it took time for regional temples to define or reconfigure their relationships. These difficulties were compounded by the fact that Buddhist temple construction continued until the mid-1600s. Shogunate regulations against new temples first appeared in the 1615 rules for specific headquarters and were extended to all Buddhist schools in 1631. In order to limit funding from daimyo and other warrior houses, the shogunate's codes for the samurai contained similar articles (Date 1930, 246-247; Tamamuro Taijō 1967, 210), but they did not immediately take hold (Kushida 1964, 1002).

Gradually, though, the headquarters brought more rural temples into their networks,

resulting in more comprehensive registers. The time required varied from school to school. While Shingon lists were generally completed by 1675 (Kushida 1964, 1006), the process of recording the Sōtō school apparently went into the 1740s. The shogunate itself was aware of the complications, and it periodically readjusted its policies to deal with the discrepancies. Initially, the 1630s lists were supposed to be definitive, but in 1692 the government of the fifth shogun Tsunayoshi acknowledged the existence of 146 new temples in Edo alone (Date 1930, 385). A later 1745 shogunate directive admitted that the deficiencies in the early lists were only rectified through a series of subsequent updates (Takano 1989, 86).

An analysis of these registers for two temples discussed above shows the value of gaining the upper hand in struggles over subordination. Chōrakuji lost its Zen identity, but yielding to Tenkai did bring benefits in the form of a Tendai branch network that expanded from thirty-six to eighty-six temples between 1637 and 1698 (Okonogi 1998, 12-20). Sokushōin had an even greater growth rate: in the 1633 -1675 period, this temple went from having just seven direct branches to forty-one, or nearly a five-fold increase in the space of forty years. Some of Sokushōin's newly registered branches had their own hierarchies of lower ranked institutions, hence the total for Sokushōin's entire network climbed to ninety-seven. This was perhaps the greatest benefit from its victory over Kongōin, because Sokushōin gained authority over the latter's own twenty-nine branches (Udaka and Tokunaga 1983, 208-209).

The Head-Branch System at Work, and the Dynamics of Regional Authority

Despite the uneven implementation and continuing inadequacies of the process, the shogunate's approach to governance accepted Buddhist headquarter authority over regional temple networks across Japan during the first decades of the early modern period. Situated at the apex of their respective hierarchies, headquarters defined the orthodox teachings that were transmitted to generations of clerics through elite training halls located within their precincts.[18] Their connections with the imperial court also gave them the right to grant or deny petitions for higher clerical and temple ranks. Headquarters further manifested their authority by conducting the most important ceremonies of their traditions, for which they could demand fiscal support and the attendance of branch temple abbots. On a more mundane administrative level, headquarters mandated clerical standards via circulars that were passed down through their branch temples' own regional networks.

As shown by Sokushōin's reliance upon Chishakuin to suppress its wayward subordinate, headquarters were recognized as arbitrators in intra-school disputes and the shogunate acknowledged their authority to punish clerics who contravened sectarian rules (Hiramatsu 1960,

337-366). If this became necessary, expulsion from the order was the most severe. Terms for this included *botsuseki* 没籍 ("dropped from the registry"), *shūbatsu* 衆抜 ("removal from the monastic community") and *datsue* (or *datsui*) 脱衣 ("defrocking" or "disrobing"). Sectarian authorities had the option to eject the guilty from a head-branch network within a particular tradition, or from a whole school. As one Shingon cleric noted to the temple and shrine magistrate Ōoka Tadasuke 大岡忠相 in 1738, expulsion in any form was the Buddhist institutional equivalent to social decapitation, because it cut off a clerics' Buddhist saccerdotal affiliation and stripped them of their socio-political identity. Lesser sentences included fines or temple confinement (Hiramatsu 1960, 350-354.).[19] The major limitation to clerical authority occurred in cases of clerical transgressions against secular law (gambling, arson, murder, etc.), adultery (with married or un-married women), and other incidents punishable by death or banishment. Under these circumstances, secular authorities oversaw prosecution and punishment (Hiramatsu 1960, 339).

Headquarter power over their schools was not omnipotent, however, and regional clerical leaders exercised their own forms of authority which gradually mitigated headquarter ability to directly intervene in branch temples affairs, especially at the lower tiers. The extent of such decentralization varied from school to school, but within the head-branch systems, regional head temples continued to exert localizing authority over their own networks. This was in part a matter of simple logistics due to the distances between headquarters and their subordinates, but more importantly, it stemmed from the inertia of late medieval regional structures and relationships that continued into the Tokugawa period. Despite efforts to the contrary, headquarter power did not fully supplant local head temple influence, a condition resulting in the continuance of "the medieval within the early modern" (Takano 1989, 111). For example, headquarters could issue decrees to every temple under their jurisdiction, but these were directed only towards their own branches/region heads. It was up to the latter to pass the item on down to the next level. In addition, regional head temples fine-tuned their supervision by generating codes based on their own authority for temples in their networks.

This control of information exchange included the power to censor petitions and documents from any temple wishing to communicate with the headquarters or secular officials, because a regional head temple referral letter (*soekan* 添簡) was required by the shogunate's codes for Buddhist communities (Kobayakawa, 1957, 269-273). The shogunate was aware of potential abuses of this authority by regional head temple administrators. Therefore, article 14 of the shogunate's *Osadamegaki* 御定書 codes (dated 1721) included a clause allowing the shogunate's temple and shrine magistracy to accept petitions without a referral if a branch temple was in conflict with its own superiors. However, later statements on this topic from the shogunate omit

this very exception—an indication of increasing rigidity within regional temple hierarchies during the 18th century.

The authority to require economic support from regional networks was another element of head-temple power. Usually this came in the form of monetary contributions for rebuilding projects or major services, and any advancement in rank was preceded by gifts of money. The potential for squeezing temples lower in the hierarchies did not go unnoticed by Tokugawa administrators, and in the 1665 shogunate codes for Buddhism (the *Shoshū jiin hatto* 諸宗寺院法度) they attempted to ameliorate the plight of subordinates by prohibiting unreasonable head temple demands (Date 1930, 371; *TKK*, 31). Whether this had much effect is another matter, and up to the end of the period headquarters and mid-level head temples imposed upon lower institutions for financial support. Eventually this fiscal burden went beyond the clergy as abbots tapped their supporting lay families (*danka* 檀家) to meet head temple requests (Takano 1989, 87). In addition, regional head temples expected their branches to provide peasant labor for their own rebuilding projects and ground maintenance. The continuity of such practices led to the many samurai strictures against excessive lay donations to religious institutions.

The gradual amalgamation of regional networks infused with pre-Tokugawa institutional memories into the coalescing head-branch systems was bound to create unusual or idiosyncratic relationships. For example, Nisson'in 二尊院 and Sanmaiin 三昧院 in Kyoto were both registered as Kan'eiji branch temples, but they were described centers of "Tendai, Shingon, Ritsu, and Jōdo" teachings—an indication that their identity stressed the catholic nature of Tendai practices (Jiin honmatsuchō kenkyūkai 1981, 1: 879-880). A more dramatic example was Ryōzen'in 霊山院, a sub-temple of the Tendai School Jikōji 慈光寺 in the village of Taira 平. Ryōzen'in was formally under Jikōji, and its abbots received final certification for accession from the Rinnōji *monzeki*.[20] And yet, even within the official head-branch registers, Tendai administrators recognized this ostensibly "Tendai" temple as actually having a Rinzai Zen orientation (the Jikōji head-branch lists clearly state *Zenshū hōryū–Rinzaishū* 禅宗法流臨済宗). Other practices also affirmed this identity: Ryōzen'in's own branch temples were all Rinzai, and population registries for Ryōzen'in's lay families in the nearby village of Ōno 大野 clearly stated their affiliation with Rinzai.[21]

This convoluted relationship began centuries before when Chōrakuji's Eichō established Ryōzen'in as another Zen/Tendai temple, but it became a problem when Ryōzen'in and Jikōji began to fight over mountain land and resources in the 1690s. The parties ultimately filed for shogunate adjudication, which resulted in Ryōzen'in's victory 1697 in a suit that clarified the boundary line between their holdings. The tensions then came to a head when the Ryōnzen'in's abbot Tandō 湛堂 and his lay supporters filed a 1722 suit with Kan'eiji to establish their temple

as a distinct entity with a direct link to Chōrakuji.[22] Prior to that, in 1713 Ryōzen'in had been renamed Hōjōin 宝城院. It is unclear why this happened, but according to the 1720 document for Tandō's abbatial appointment, the temple had been empty, and therefore it is possible that Jikōji had taken advantage of Ryōzen'in weakness by stripping way its original name and pulling it more firmly back into Jikōji's orbit. In effort to reclaim his temple's unique past and to substantiate his circumvention of Jikōji authority, Tando cited Eichō's legacy and the 1697 shogunate ruling. Clerics at Ryōzen'in's own sub-temples also presented as proof two bells inscribed with Ryōzen'in's unique "mountain name" (*sangō* 山号) of Nengesan 拈華山. This was particularly important because such nomenclature identified a temple as an independent institution. Without such a designation, Ryōzen'in would remain within the "mountain" (Tokisan 都幾山) of Jikōji as a sub-temple. Furthermore, *nenge* alludes to a prominent story of the Zen tradition in which Shakyamuni Buddha holds up a flower one day and his disciple Mahākāśyapa perceives the Buddha's Dharma. Just as this event is said to be the start of the Zen tradition, Tandō was clearly bolstering his temple's *yuisho*-based claims by drawing upon imagery that strongly reflected an independent Zen identity. What is more, the Shakyamuni-Mahākāśyapa interaction supposedly happened on the Vulture Peak (Ryōjusen 霊鷲山) in India. Removal of the second character 鷲 from Ryōjusen results in "Ryōzen." Tandō's claims were thus substantiated by deft manipulations of Zen lore for his immediate politico-religious purposes.

Jikōji and the other cloisters did not take the assertion lightly. Angered by Ryōzen'in's apparent hubris, they filed their own complaint with Kan'eiji couched in charges of apostasy and duplicity:

> [Abbreviation of the first section]
>
> If [Ryōzen'in] is within the Jikō mountain [i.e. it is a Jikōji sub-temple], and the head of their Dharma lineage is also Chōrakuji, then its residents should preserve Tendai teachings. However, they set themselves up as Zen monks, and with selfish pride they have long used the device of legal claims to pursue their arrogant suit [for independence]. [Ryōzen'in] has ceaselessly fomented dissension, and generations of clerics of Jikōji have not had peace or normalcy but are rather perplexed by a myriad of difficulties. In order for the monks of this mountain to live in harmony, we earnestly beseech that [Ryōzen'in] be made to erase the mountain and temple names that have been secretly inscribed on the bells, to no longer speak of being outside of Jikōji's sub-temples, to affirm the Tendai teachings, and henceforth not turn their backs on directives.
>
> 1722/5
>
> [To:] Toeizan Jushin'in hōin sama

Goshittō Shinkaiin hōin sama[23]

[Names and seals of 20 Jikōji cloisters]

(*TGS*, 110-111)

Kan'eiji's final verdict gave something to both sides. First, it accepted Ryōzen'in's institutional claims resting on its 500-year old ties with Chōrakuji via Eichō, and on a series of maps and other written statements produced in over the past 100 years (including the shogunate's 1697 ruling), each of which treated Ryōzen'in as independent temple. The officials also cited precedents from Enryakuji 延暦寺 where Mudōji 無動寺 was within the larger precincts of Mt. Hiei, yet it operated as a distinct Tendai institution. Accordingly, Tendai authorities allowed Ryōzen'in to keep its name, but they ordered the abbot to remove the inscriptions on the now notorious bells as they were judged to be spurious. Finally, when any of Ryōzen'in's own branches or sub-temples fell vacant, Jikōji could exercise head temple prerogatives over the new appointments, but since Ryōzen'in was now officially seen as a "Zen" temple, Jikōji had to consult with Chōrakuji when it came to appointing new residents for Ryōzen'in itself.

From Jikōji's perspective, several other clauses ameliorated possible disgruntlement with the verdict. One, Ryōzen'in was still listed as a Jikōji sub-temple in the Tendai temple registries submitted to the shogunate; therefore, Tandō and his successors had to participate in annual communal meetings and rites such as the memorial celebrations for Jikōji's founder and New Year's greetings. Two, new abbots to Ryōzen'in and its four cloisters were required to receive *kanjō* 灌頂 (anointment) at Chōrakuji, a stipulation ensuring their nominal affiliation with the Tendai school.

The Ryōzen'in case was unusual, but the resolution reflects an early modern Buddhist solution to a problem arising from the forced compounding of older traditions. By adjusting the meaning and function of head-branch relationships in response to a suit where both sides drew upon history, tradition and the potential play in Tokugawa period legal structures, the shogunate and Kan'eiji officials found a way to allow the existence of Zen within Tendai and Ryōzen'in within Jikōji, while maintaining the basic integrity of the head-branch system. (Ironically, the temple that had succumbed to Tenkai's machinations now facilitated the rebuttal of another Tendai effort to displace a Rinzai Zen legacy.) From the purist perspective of modern Japanese practices, Ryōzen'in would seem an aberration, a hybrid "Tendai/Zen" institution that did not seemingly fit into either tradition, yet it is this very complexity that gives the story meaning. As an indication of the residual influence of pre-Tokugawa regional contingencies, and the fluid relationship between institutions and teachings that continued into the early modern period, the Ryōzen'in case shows how "early" of "early modern Buddhism" was still very much at play, and "modern" structures

consisting of a rigid one-to-correspondence between institution and doctrine had yet to apply to every temple. Furthermore, it is another example of how smaller temples in rural regions could utilize idiosyncrasies of the early modern Buddhist networks to their advantage in contests of wills against immediate superiors.

The Liaison Temple System

Clerical will to assert control was also reflected during the establishment of a second system mandated by the shogunate for handing Buddhist affairs. The term *fure* ("notifications" 触) referred to shogunate statements on policies and rules, thus the name for this other structure — *furegashira* 触頭 ("the officials in charge of *fure*")— alluded to their function as liaisons between samurai and clerical administrators, a role which paralleled the *buke tensō* who handled the court's communications with the shogunate. Unlike the many Kansai-area headquarters with their pre-Tokugawa origins, the shogunate often appointed prominent Edo temples as liaisons. They were ranked lower than the headquarters they represented, yet they gained considerable authority over certain areas of Buddhist clerical management.

The liaison system emerged a response to several issues facing shogunate authorities, the first being a geographical limitation to the efficiency of head-branch networking. Most headquarters were outside the Kantō, hence head-branch communications might require the dispatch of a courier to the Kyoto or elsewhere. As a result, a message intended for a specific cleric or temple might crisscross several regions. For temples located to the west of Kyoto such a network was acceptable, but it would be a ludicrous means for contacting Buddhists clerics who might be within a day's walk from Edo castle. Therefore, the designation of Edo liaisons gave shogunate officials conveniently placed nodes for handling communications with Buddhist institutions (Udaka 1987, 159-160).

Secondly, the liaison system had the added benefit of implementing temple oversight with a structure more convenient to samurai administrators (Tamamuro Taijō 1967, 51). Although many of the 270 daimyo domains had widely dispersed holdings, at their core many governed relatively integrated geographic units. Head–branch connections invariably crossed these domain boundaries, which meant clerical systems did not readily fit into the geographically oriented structures of samurai governance. The liaisons systems eased this problem to a certain extent, because their officials were responsible for handing shogunate communications with temples in specific regions. Furthermore, since daimyo mortuary temples (*bodaiji* 菩提寺) often served as local liaisons, domain bureaucracies could use the same system to promulgate their own directives to temples within their jurisdiction.

Liaisons never displaced headquarters as sources of Buddhist doctrines and identity. However, given the fact they asserted authority over the flow of information between the clergy and the shogunate, including the right to issue or deny the referrals so vital for any clerical petition to the shogunate or a headquarters, they operated as clerical administrators interposed by the Tokugawa regime between the highest Buddhist institutional leadership and local temple systems. This role was meant to facilitate flows of information, but Udaka (1987, 227) has argued that the system provided the shogunate with means for circumscribing the power of Kyoto-based clerical authorities. Whether the liaison officials were meant to undercut headquarter power is difficult to gauge, and such motivations perhaps varied from one cleric to another, but at the very least the liaison system offered an opportunity for regionally oriented clerics to enhance their own authority at the expense of elite temples in the Kansai.

The shogunate thus mandated the liaison system for its own purposes, but the point above suggests how powerful clerics could shape it according to their own goals. Taking further advantage of Tokugawa patronage, sectarian leaders at Kan'eiji further strengthened the authority of their headquarters over eastern Tendai clerics by appointing select sub-temple abbots within Kan'eiji's precincts to serve as liaison officials for the region. (These officials appeared in at the end of the Jikōji petition.) Tenkai's contemporary Sūden drew upon his own connections with the Tokugawa to enhance his personal influence over the Gozan faction of Rinzai Zen, and thereby implemented a similar shift of clerical authority from Kyoto to Edo. In 1615, the shogunate closed the medieval Registrar General of Monks (*tenka sōroku* 天下僧録) located in the Rokuon'in 鹿苑院 sub-temple of Shōkokuji 相国寺. Sūden then revived it in 1619 upon the orders of the second shogun Hidetada and moved it to his newly constructed Konchi'in 金地院 temple in Edo (Takano 1989, 86).[24]

The Shingi Shingon liaison creation process experienced convolutions as well. In Ieyasu's day, a certain Yūchō 祐長, the abbot of a prominent Okegawa temple called Myōjōin 明星院, oversaw Shingi clerical matters within the Tokugawa domain (*SSKTa,* 734-739; Udaka 1981). However, he gradually lost power following Ieyasu's death in 1616. Yūchō marginalization stemmed from his temple's inconvenient distance from Edo, and from power shifts within Edo itself as Hidetada replaced Ieyasu's advisors with his own from 1616 onwards. By the time of the 1624 dispute between Sokushōin and Kongōin, four other Edo temples had displaced Myōjōin to became Shingi Shingon's liaisons.[25] This realignment is evident in the final expulsion order against Kongōin of that year, in which Yūchō was just one out of forty-four signatories (Udaka and Tokunaga 1983, 6-9). None of these Shingi liaisons predated Ieyasu's 1590 entry into the Kantō, but all were operating by 1617 (Udaka 1987, 201-227; Kushida 1964, 879-880). Reasons for their section are not fully understood, but Sūden once noted in a letter that he consulted with

their abbots on Shingi matters; hence Sūden possibly interjected himself into Shingi affairs by supporting their appointment to liaison stature.

The Shingi liaison system stabilized by the mid-1600, but a major disruption occurred in the last decades of the century, when a cleric named Ryūkō 隆光 (1649-1724) used his close ties with the fifth shogun Tsunayoshi 綱吉 and his mother Keishōin 桂昌院 to elevate his temple of Chisokuin 知足院 above the other Shingi liaisons. Building upon his success with Tsunayoshi, he received shogunate permission to rebuild his temple near Chiyoda castle. Moreover, the temple was renamed Gojiin 護持院, and Ryūkō was honored with the highest court rank of *daisōjō* 大僧正 (Kushida 1964, 883, 1050). During this period, Ryūkō also strengthened the liaison system to ensure the four temples' authority over all Shingi institutions. Eventually, Gojiin was ranked as having no headquarters (*muhonji* 無本寺), which meant that it answered to no one but the shogunate. From this lofty position, it supervised the other liaisons.[26] Alas for Ryūkō and his "superior liaison" position, Gojiin's prominence was fleeting. Following Tsunayoshi's death in 1709, Ryūkō returned to his native province of Yamato, and Gojiin's abbacy was filled by clerics from the Kansai Shingi headquarters of Chishakuin and Hasedera 長谷寺. A fire consumed the temple in 1717; rather than rebuild it, the eight shogun Yoshimume 吉宗 amalgamated Gojiin with Gokokuji 護国寺, another Shingi temple favored by Keishōin. It subsequently lost its unique status, and the four temples resumed their role as Shingi liaisons with their authority ironically enhanced by the cleric who had tried to dominate them.

Once established, the liaisons' authority expanded to include personnel affairs. On a routine basis they kept track of temple conditions, clerical appointments, petitions for advances in rank, and the registries specifically for temple residents (*ninbetsu aratame chō* 人別改帳) that differentiated the clergy from peasants, townsmen and outcasts. If problems arose between clerical communities, the shogunate expected the liaisons to adjudicate the claims along with the head temples (a point seen in the Jikōji case cited above),[27] and shogunate told samurai administrators to consult with liaison officials in cases of crimes requiring the severe punishment of priests (*TKKK* 2, 144). Upon occasion, the liaisons themselves issued major codes. Such was the case in 1722 when the temple and shrine magistrate Doi Toshitada 土井利忠 required new regulations for governing clerical deportment within each school.[28] Although this was done in the name of the headquarters, in many cases the liaisons formulated the actual contents and passed them out through their networks to the countryside.

To briefly summarize the discussion to this point, the shogunate supported the early-modern head-branch and liaison networks in order to enhance accountability and internal integrity among the thousands of Buddhist temples scattered across Japan, but it was the Buddhist themselves who configured these networks to suit their own needs and objectives. These activities

sometimes created painful reconfigurations of pre-1600 relationships and the occasional strange bedfellows, but by the early- to mid-1700s, both systems had stabilized such that Buddhist schools in the Kantō shared the similar organizational principles.

At the same time, sectarian contingencies, policies and legacies resulted in differing interpetations and implementations. In the case of Tendai networks created by Tenkai and his successors, it was not the largest school,[29] but Kan'eiji's position as both headquarter and liaison give it great control over older Tendai temples in eastern Japan such as Jikōji, Chōrakuji and their respective branch systems. This was further strengthened by the presence of the highest ranking Tendai training hall within Kan'eiji precincts, which meant that future Tendai abbots stayed within Kan'eiji's sphere of influence.[30]

Conversely, the transregional networks that evolved in Shingi Shingon were more complex. The school itself was much larger in the Kantō,[31] and it developed an extenisve system of training centers from the 17th century onwards, but Shingi rules mandated a period of study in the Kansai for clerics who lived in temples like Sokushōin. Hence, the Kansai area Shingi headquarters of Chishakuin and Hasedera 長谷寺 did not relinquish their ultimate control over monastic training. In addition, as noted in the account of Sokushōin, some Kantō temples sought direct branch affiliation with prestigious Kansai *monzeki*. At the same time, the Kantō Shingi liaisons' developed and maintained a firm grip over personnel management. Therefore, in contradistinction to Tendai, the Kansai headquarters remained the ultimate source of authority for Shingi Shingon clerical identity and doctrines, but like Tendai, the Kantō rural heads and liaisons in fact worked to assert their control over clerical issues (including the appointment of temple abbots) and the implementation of shogunate policies among the many Shingi head-branch networks (Ichishima 1907, 382).

Forging Status Identity: A Social Political Implication of Buddhist Institution Building

For any one who undertook ordination at a local Buddhist temple, and thereby transitioned from a secular to a religious community, the head-branch and liaison systems played increasingly important roles as his clerical career advanced. Following a period of initial practice under his ordination master, a novice would gradually proceed through higher levels of training, and if he possessed the ritual and intellectual skills to meet the standards set by his school, he could attain the level of headquarter certification needed to become a temple abbot. During this process, the local head temples liaisons would handle his paper work, including the documents required for traveling to training centers, and weigh in if he encountered or created trouble. Once established as an abbot, he would enter into a community that could provide him with support for such things

as ritual activities and temple rebuilding projects.[32] These associations could be divissive as well, in that affiliation with a particular headquarters could foster sectarian tensions between abbots of different schools who might live in the same village. When this occurred, the head-branch and liaison networks could help a cleric caught in litigation or conflict.

Above and beyond such internal considerations, these systems also affected his relationships with other parts of early modern society, because the head-branch and liaison hierarchies became the organizational "skeletons" of the Buddhist status (*mibun* 身分) community. The Tokugawa shogunate never issued a single, overarching code to clearly stipulate the form and function of the early modern social hierarchy, and like the Buddhist administrative systems, the overall implementation of status emerged from confluence of different social practices. As indicated by the early temple codes, the shogunate began to impose its authority with regulations that restricted the spheres of activity for recognized pre-1600 social elites like the Kyoto aristocracy, samurai houses, and prominent temples. The shogunate also benefited from earlier regulatory activities like Toyotomi Hideyoshi's order to disarm peasants and his orders for cadastral surveys. While perhaps limited in their immediate effect, these Toyotomi policies differentiated commoners (peasants and townspeople; *heimin* 平民) from the samurai, and thereby fixed their subordination to the daimyo and other samurai fief holders. Furthermore, the shogunate-mandated temple certification system for the eradication of Christianity and other proscribed religious movements gradually evolved into a mechanism for re-enforcing status differentiation between samurai, commoners, and reviled groups. It is also important to note that status identification was informed by localized practices, biases, and relationships that organized communities around a particular occupation. Since status depended on negotiations of power and authority between such communities, changes in inter-community relationships could result in the samurai acceptance of redefined or newly created status groups that centered on a particular occupation or activity (Ehlers 2018, 3-13; Groemer 2001).

The Tokugawa and other daimyo thus did not create status identity per se, but rather akin to the acceptance of older Buddhist organizing methods, they gradually developed a method for governing society with status identities that was built upon the integration of earlier social practices (elite and local), legal precedents, economic systems and cultural traditions. According Yoshida Nobutaka, under the mature social order that had coalesced by the mid-1700s, the formal recognition of a status group required the following criteria: 1) the control and management of a specific form of work or activity; 2) a communal organization that preserved and maintained that work; and 3) specified obligations that were owed to samurai rulers in exchange for public recognition (Yoshida 1998, 302; Howell 2005, 24-44). For example, peasants controlled the production of agricultural products, they were governed through semi-autonomous village-based

communities,[33] and they paid taxes and labor duties to their domain suzerains. In Buddhism's case, prayer rituals for the wellbeing of the state, a monopoly over funeral rites for families at all social levels, and the confirmation of a family's sectarian affiliation (*shūmon aratame* 宗門改) fulfilled items 1 and 3, while the head-branch and liaison networks that linked *monzeki* elites to provincial clerics met criteria # 2.

The recognition of Buddhism's unique status identity never mitigated samurai oversight. Clerics were still governed as domain residents subject to samurai penal codes, but the conferral of identity that came from the head-branch and liaison systems differentiated members of a school from peasants, townspeople, and other religious practitioners such as Shugendō 修験道 or Yoshida 吉田 Shinto clerics who also had their own organizations and status identity.[34] Again, if conflicts arose over the right to perform certain rituals such as prayer rites (kitō 祈祷) that were popular among the laity, then the Buddhists and their opponents would draw upon the prestige of their schools and the authority their respective liaisons and headquarters to assert their claims. Referring once again to the previously cited Shingi Shingon cleric's comment to temple and shrine magistrate Ōoka, expulsion from a religious organization not only stripped away an individual's identity, it also took away the safety net provided by their affiliation with a recognized status group. Therefore, rather than being mere hierarchies of static organizations, the head-branch and liaison networks were integral to conduct of clerical daily life in temples throughout the early modern period.

Notes

1 McMullin 1984 details the Oda and Toyotomi campaigns against armed Buddhist groups.

2 Tsuji 1953 discusses these codes in detail and provides biographical information on Sūden.

3 His portfolio also included the creation of regulations for the imperial court and oversight of foreign relations. Surveys of these activities are in Tamamuro 2004, 116-229; Butler 2002, 202-209; and Tsuji 1953, 26-88. Tsuji 1953 also discusses the Tokugawa codes in detail.

4 Tsuji 1955 is often cited in reference to this view, but Klautau 2008 places Tsuji's research within a larger field of Meiji-era arguments for Buddhism's decline during the early modern period.

5 This does not mean that court-shogunate relations were always cordial, or that Tokugawa authority lacked substance. In 1627 the emperor Gomizunoo 後水尾 and the shogunate came to loggerheads over his bestowal of purple robes to certain Zen temple abbots. The shogunate rejected Gomizunoo's awards because it was not consulted beforehand. Six Zen priests were exiled for arguing against the shogunate's position and the rebuttal influenced Gomizunoo's decision to abdicate (Takano 1989, 88). The punishment amounted to the rejection of imperial autonomy, but the shogunate eventually pardoned the clerics and returned the robes to the abbots. In short, once the point was made and the dust settled, the shogunate reverted to the status quo, because it valued the maintenance of good relations with the court (Butler 2002, 234). In exchange, the court had to confer with shogunate officials prior to making future bestowals.

6 Representative English studies of status are Howell 2005, Elher 2018, and Ooms 1996, pp.243-261.

7 Yamamoto 2010 surveys the evolution of *yuisho* studies.

8 Codes for other prominent temples—Jiōnji 慈恩寺 in Iwatsuki (1613) and Asakusa's Sensōji 浅草寺 (1614) (Date 1930, 329-330, 334)— reflect Tenkai's aggressive policy towards his own school.

9 *SSKS*, 58, lists temples that accepted Tenkai/Kan'eiji leadership.

10 This relationship began with the sixth son of emperor Gomizunoo who became Tenkai's disciple in 1638 and Rinnōji's abbot in 1647. These abbots actually resided at Kan'eiji.

11 Chōrakuji data from Okonogi 1998, 1-3; and Gunma-ken shi hensan iinkai 1992, 623, 632-636. Documents pertaining to Chōrakuji's early Edo period relations with the shogunate are in Okonogi 1997, 99-263, 280-300. Hashimoto 2007 offers a new account of Tenkai's campaign to control Chōrakuji.

12 The shogunate's interest in Chōrakuji and the Nitta was a byproduct of Tokugawa efforts to trace their lineage from Ieyasu back to the Minamoto shoguns of the Kamakura age. The Nitta came from the Minamoto, and therefore the Tokugawa tried to claim the same heritage by invoking the memory of an ancestor who supposedly came from the Nitta district (Wright 1996, 88-89).

13 This account is from Udaka 1987, 45-48.

14 Udaka 1987, 107-112, analyzes these events. Related documents are in *SSKS*, 232-236, and Udaka and Tokunaga 1983, 4-6.

15 Kushida 1964, 1015-1021, outlines branch and *monto* differences.

16 The transcribed petitions are in Udaka and Tokunaga 1983, 49, 86-87,104-105, 130, 150-151. Udaka 1999, 573-582, describes the process. This usage of *monto* was particular to Tendai and Shingon. Other schools used different names for these temples, and *monto* had different implications for the Jōdo shinshū, but I will not discuss these details due to space limitations.

17 The most extensive collection of these lists is in Jiin homatsuchō kenkyūkai 1981. Tamamuro Fumio has an excellent summary of these documents in volume 3, 5-26.

18 A good overview of headquarter prerogatives, rights and limitations is in Toyota 1982, 57-70.

19 Date 1930, 233-241 lists punishments and examples of their implementation.

20 See the Jiin honmatsuchō kenkyūkai 1981, 1: 783. An example of Rinnōji *monzeki* certification for Ryōzen'in's abbot Tandō is in *TGS*, 109, document no. 31.

21 Lay family registers indicating Ryōzen'in's Rinzai orientation are in the archives of the Morita family now held by the Saitama Prefectural Archives. The catalogue numbers and dates for these records are 347 (1752), 28 (1770) 33 (1781), 71 (1848). They are listed in Saitama-ken ritsu monjokan 1982, 176-177. I thank the Archive staff for showing me these documents in 1999.

22 The following account is based on a short description of this conflict in Tokigawa-mura shi hensan iinkai 2001, 397-398, and my reading of transcribed documents relating to the suit in *TGS*, 110-113, nos. 224 and 225. Passages from Ryōzen'in's daily record are in *TGS*, 114-116, no. 226.

23 The recipients were liaison officials within Kan'eiji who handled internal affairs. I will discuss this office below.

24 Udaka 1987, 179-180, and Collcutt 1981, 119-123, discuss this office. The 1615 order to close the medieval registrar in is Date 1930, 337, and Hidetada's revival order to Sūden is on page 345.

25 They were: Shinpukuji 真福寺, Enpukuji 円福寺, Konshōin 根生院, and Mirokuji 弥勒寺.

26 The list is in Date 1930, 417. Gojiin's role as registrar is described in Kushida 1964, 889-898. As in this case, the stature of *muhonjii* could be accorded to prominent temples such as Gojiin or Tenkai's Kita'in in Kawagoe. Hōzawa Naohide (2015, 129-147) has done research on a different kind of unlisted temple in the Kansai. Their abbots were fully were certified by their ordination in a recognized Buddhist school, but these singular temples functioned as private family chapels that were outside the regular governing systems.

27 The shogunate recognized this particular role in1741, but it was preceded by an earlier article in the 1722 *Shoshū sōryō hatto* 諸宗僧侶法度 that ordered clerics disputing claims over mountain timber stands, precinct boundaries, paddies and fields, and parishioners to inform the liaison temples. See Date 1930*,* 410, no.192.

28 Doi's order is in Date 1930, 416-419. The codes are on pages 399-416.

29 For example, in the upper Musashi region that is now Saitama Prefecture, there were only 353 Tendai temples among a total of 3363 listed in 19th century records (*SSKTb,* 882).

30 There is insufficient space to discuss the Kantō area Jōdo school in detail, but to reneforce this point of clerical agency under the aegius of Tokugawa patronage, the shoguns' family temple of Zōjōji 増上寺 did not formally surplant the Jōdo headquarter of Chion'in 知恩院 in Kyoto, but it did become a liaison, and it oversaw a system of eighteen training halls that centralized clerical education in the Kantō. Like Tenkai's Kan'eiji, Zōjōji thus created its own sphere of authority in eastern Japan (Udaka 1999, 661-664; Udaka 1993).

31 There were 1700 Shingi temples in upper Musashi, over 400% more than Tendai (*SSKTb,* 882).

32 Hōzawa 2004, 59-96, draws upon data from Shingi Shingon temples in Awa to discuss the role of head-branch systems in rural temple practices.

33 Peasants had to obey samurai laws and their officials answered to domain administrators, but village residents internally managed many of their daily life matters. Ooms 1996, Ch. 4, discusses this interplay between commoner and samurai authority.

34 Takano 1989 discusses the formation and activities of Shugendō governing authorities. For more information on the nature and development of early modern Yoshida Shinto communities, see Sugiyama 1980, Inoue 2007, Inoue 2008, and Maeda 2003.

Bibliography

Abbreviations

SSKS Saitama-ken, ed. *Shinpen Saitama-ken shi shiryōhen* 埼玉県史資料編. 1987, vol. 18. Urawa: Saitama-ken.

SSKTa Saitama-ken, ed. *Shinpen Saitama-ken shi tsūshihen* 埼玉県通史編. 1988, vol. 3. Urawa: Saitama-ken.

SSKTb Saitama-ken, ed. *Shinpen Saitama-ken shi tsūshihen* 埼玉県通史編. 1989, vol. 4. Urawa: Saitama-ken.

TGS Tokigawa-mura shi hensan iinkai 都幾川村史編さん委員会, ed. 1993. *Tokigawa-mura shi shiryō 4(2): Taira chiku II* 都幾川村史資料 4(2): 平地区 II. Tokigawa-mura, Saitama Pref.: Tokigawa-mura.

TKK Shihōshō daijin kanbō shomuka 司法省大臣官房庶務課, and Kikuchi Shunsuke 菊池駿助, eds. 1931-1932. *Tokugawa kinrei kō* 徳川禁令考, vol. 5. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

TKKK Shihōshō daijin kanbō shomuka 司法省大臣官房庶務課, and Kikuchi Shunsuke 菊池駿助, eds. 1931-1932. *Tokugawa kinrei kō kōshū* 徳川禁令考後聚, vol. 2. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

Other References

Bitō, Masahide. 1991. "Thought and religion, 1550-1700." In *The Cambridge History of Japan,* vol. 4, ed. John W. Hall. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, Philip. 2012. "The Political Order." In *Japan Emerging: Premodern History to 1850,* ed. Karl Friday, 321-332. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Boot, W. J. 2000. "The Death of a Shogun: Deification in Early Modern Japan." In *Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami*, ed. John Breen and Mark Teewen, pp. 144-166. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Butler, Lee. 2002. *Emperor and Aristocracy in Japan, 1467-1680: Resilience and Renewal*. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Asia Center.

Collcutt, Martin. 1981. *Five Mountains; The Rinzai Zen Monastic Institution in Medieval Japan*. Harvard East Asian Monographs 85. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Date Mitsuyoshi 伊達光美. 1930. *Nihon shūkyō seido shiryō ruijūkō* 日本宗教制度史料類聚考. Tokyo: Ganshōdō.

Ehler, Maren. 2018. *Give and Take: Poverty, and the Status Order in Early Modern Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.

Gunma-ken shi hensan iinkai 群馬県史編さん委員会, ed. 1992. *Gunma kenshi tsūshi* 群馬県史通史, vol. 6. Maebashi, Gunma Pref.: Gunma-ken.

Groemer, Gerald. 2001. “The Creation of the Edo Outcaste Order.” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 27.2: 263-293.

Hashimoto Yukio 橋本幸雄. 2007. *Kōzuke no kuni Serata Chōrakuji kaishū to Tenkai* 上野の国世良田長楽寺改宗と天海. Tokyo: Iwata shoin.

Hiramatsu Yoshirō 平松義朗. 1960. *Kinsei kenji soshōhō no kenkyū* 近世検事訴訟法の研究. Tokyo: Sōbunsha.

Hōzawa Naohide 朴澤直秀. 2004. *Bakufu kenryoku to jidan seido* 幕府権力と寺檀制度. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

————. 2015. *Kinsei bukkyō no seido to jōhō*. 近世仏教の制度と情報. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

Howell, David. 2005. *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ichishima Kenkichi 市島謙吉, ed. 1907. *Zokuzoku gunsho ruijū* 続々群書類従, vol. 12. Tokyo: Kokusho kankōkai.

Inoue Tomokatsu 井上智勝. 2007. *Kinsei no jinja to chōtei ken'i* 近世の神社と朝廷権威. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

————. 2008. “Kinsei no shinshoku soshiki: furegashira wo yōsuru soshiki wo taishō ni” 近世の神職組織—触頭を擁する組織を対象に. *Kokuritsu rekishi minzoku hakubutsukan kenkyū hōkoku* 国立歴史民俗博物館研究報告 148: 357-378.

Jiin honmatsuchō kenkyūkai 寺院本末帳研究会, ed. 1981. *Edo bakufu jiin honmatsuchō shūsei* 江戸幕府寺院本末帳集成, 3 vols. Tokyo: Yūzankaku.

Kitagawa, Joseph. 1966. *Religion in Japanese History*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Klautau, Orion. 2008. “Against the Ghosts of Recent Past: Meiji Scholarship and the Discourse of Edo-Period Buddhist Decadence.” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 35.2: 263-303.

Kobayakawa Kingo 小早川欣吾. 1957. *Kinsei minji soshō seido no kenkyū*, 近世民事訴訟制度の研究. Tokyo: Yūhikaku.

Kushida Ryōkō 櫛田良洪. 1964. *Shingon mikkyō seiritsu katei no kenkyū* 真言密教成立過程の研究. Tokyo: Sankibō busshōrin.

Maeda Hiromi. 2003. “Imperial Authority and Local Shrines: The Yoshida House and the Creation of a Countrywide Shinto Institution in Early Modern Japan.” PhD. diss. Harvard University.

Mizubayashi Takeshi 水林彪. 1987. *Fūkensei no saihen to Nihonteki shakai no kakuritsu* 封建制の再編と日本的社会の確立. Tokyo: Yamagawa shuppansha.

McMullin, Neil. 1984. *Buddhism and the State in Sixteenth-Century Japan*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Okonogi Teruyuki 小此木輝之. 1997. *Chōrakuji monjo: shiryō sanshū komonjo hen* 長楽寺文書史料纂集古文書編, vol. 27. Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruijū kanseikai.

————. 1998. “Kinsei ni okeru Serata Chōrakuji no shomondai” 近世における世良田長楽寺の諸問題. *Taishō daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 大正大学研究紀要 83: 1-3;

Ooms, Herman. 1985. *Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570-1680*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

————. 1996. *Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, Power, Law.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Saitama-ken ritsu monjokan 埼玉県立文書館, ed. 1982. *Morita-ke/Noguchi-ke monjo mokuroku* 森田家・野口家文書目録. Urawa: Saitama-ken ritsu monjokan.

Sonehara Satoshi. 2006. “The Establishment of Early Modern Buddhism.” *Acta Asiatica* 91: 65-83.

Sugiyama Shigetsugu 椙山林継. 1980. “Yoshida-ke Kantō yakusho no sōritsu to shoki no katsudō” 吉田家関東役所の創立と初期の活動. *Kokugakuin daigaku Nihon bunka kenkyūsho kiyō* 国学院大学日本文化研究所紀要 (45): 59-106.

Takano Toshihiko 高埜利彦. 1989. *Kinsei Nihon no kokka kenryoku to shūkyō* 近世日本の国家権力と宗教. Tokyo daigaku shuppankai.

————. 1992. “Idō suru mibun: shinshoku to hyakushō no aida” 移動する身分：神職と百姓の間. In *Nihon no kinsei 7 mibun to kakushiki* 日本の近世 7 身分と格式, ed. Asao Naohiro 朝尾直弘. Tokyko: Chūō kōronsha.

————. 2014. *Kinsei no chōtei to shūkyō* 近世の朝廷と宗教. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan.

Tamamuro Fumio 圭室文雄. 1971. *Edo bakufu no shūkyō tōsei* 江戸幕府の宗教統制.Tokyo: Hyōronsha.

————. ed. 2004. *Seikai no dōsha: Tenkai・Sūden* 政界の導者 天海・崇伝. Nihon no meisō 15. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

Tamamuro Taijō 圭室諦成. 1967. *Nihon bukkyō shi* 日本佛教史, vol. 3. Kyoto: Hōzōkan.

Tokigawa-mura shi hensan iinkai 都幾川村史編さん委員会, ed. 2001. *Tokigawa-mura shi tsūshi hen* 都幾川村史通史編. Tokigawa-mura, Saitama Pref.: Tokigawa-mura.

Toyota Takeshi 豊田武. 1982. *Shūkyō seidoshi* 宗教制度史. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan.

Tsuji Zennosuke 辻善之助. 1953. *Nihon bukkyōshi* 日本仏教史, vol. 8. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.

Tsuji Zennosuke 辻善之助. 1955. *Nihon bukkyōshi* 日本仏教史, vol. 10. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.

Udaka Yoshiaki 宇高良哲. 1981. "Kurata Myōshōin Yūchō ni tsuite: Shingi Shingonshū no furegashira no henkan to chūshin to shite" 倉田明星院祐長について 新義真言宗の触頭の変換を中心として. *Saitama chihō shi* 埼玉地方史 11: 1-13.

————. 1987. *Edo bakufu no bukkyō kyōdan tōsei* 江戸幕府の仏教教団統制. Tokyo: Tōyō bunka shuppan.

————. 1993. "Jōdoshū furegashira Zōjōji yakusha funen jikō" 浄土宗触頭増上寺役者譜年次考. *Taishō daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 大正該大学研究紀要 78: 49-80.

————. 1999. *Kinsei Kantō bukkyō kyōdanshi no kenkyū: Jōdoshū, Shingonshū, Tendaishū wo chūshin ni.* 近世関東仏教教団史の研究 : 浄土宗・真言宗・天台宗を中心に. Tokyo: Bunka shoin.

Udaka Yoshiaki 宇高良哲 and Tokunaga Ryūsen 徳永隆宣, eds. 1983. *Musashi Yoshimi Sokushōin monjō: Shingi Shingonshū* 武蔵吉見息障院文書: 新義真言宗. Tokyo: Tōyō bunka shuppan.

Wright, Diane. 1996. "The Power of Religion/ the Religion of Power: The Case of Mantokuji." PhD. diss., University of Toronto.

Yamamoto Eiji 山本英二. 2010. "Nihon chūkinseishi ni okeru yuishorōn no sōkatsu to tenbō" 日本中近世史における由緒論の総括と展望. In *Yuisho no hikakushi* 由緒の比較史, ed. Rekishigaku kenkyūkai 歴史学研究会, 3-27. Tokyo: Aoki shoten.

Yoshida Nobuyuki 吉田伸之. 1998. *Kinsei toshi shakai no mibun kōzō* 近世都市社会の身分構造. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppanai.