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The Ausubel Auction with the Receive Option of Over-Assignments
http://hdl.handle.net/10723/00004049
http://hdl.handle.net/10723/00004049bb6ea351-36eb-4b4c-82ca-8808bc7b94e3
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
keizai_161_29-37.pdf (383.5 kB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||
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| 公開日 | 2021-03-02 | |||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||
| タイトル | The Ausubel Auction with the Receive Option of Over-Assignments | |||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||
| 著者 |
OKAMOTO, Noriaki
× OKAMOTO, Noriaki
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| 著者別名 | ||||||||
| 識別子Scheme | WEKO | |||||||
| 識別子 | 7558 | |||||||
| 姓名 | 岡本, 実哲 | |||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||
| 内容記述 | The Ausubel auction, which is introduced by Ausubel (2004), is a dy-namic version of the Vickrey auction. Okamoto (2018) shows that in the original Ausubel auction, sincere-bidding by all bidders may not be an ex-post perfect equilibrium, and modifies the Ausubel auction, the Ausubel auction with sequential rationing, so that sincere-bidding by all bidders is always an ex-post perfect equilirium. In this paper, we propose another modification of the Ausubel auction, namely the Ausubel auction with the receive option of over-assignments. We also show that in this auction, sincere-bidding by all bidders is always an ex-post perfect equilibrium, which obtains the Vickrey outcome. | |||||||
| 内容記述 | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | 【論文／Articles】 | |||||||
| 書誌情報 |
明治学院大学経済研究 = The papers and proceedings of economics 巻 161, p. 29-37, 発行日 2021-01-31 |
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| ISSN | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | ISSN | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | 1349-483X | |||||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA11966517 | |||||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||||
| 出版者 | ||||||||
| 出版者 | 明治学院大学経済学会 | |||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||
| 内容記述 | Article | |||||||
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Cite as
OKAMOTO, Noriaki, 2021, The Ausubel Auction with the Receive Option of Over-Assignments: 明治学院大学経済学会, 29–37 p.
